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THE TRANSFORMATION OF FREEDOM OF
SPEECH: UNSNARLING THE TWISTED
ROOTS OF CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC
STEVEN J. ANDRi*
I. INTRODUCTION
The roots of the conflict represented by the positions of the
majority and minority opinions in Citizens United v. FEC lie
hidden-embedded in the debris of a fundamental change in the
legal treatment of rights that occurred almost a century ago. The
conflict is the product of a basic shift in liberal perspective in
reaction to the rise of wealthy and powerful industrial magnates
following the Civil War. The intellectual legacy that accompanied
this shift resulted from the impact of Progressive thinking that
rose to the fore after the War Between the States. This legacy
created and left unresolved a philosophical clash between precepts
developing out of contemporary and classical liberal thought.
While the Citizens United case hints at the contours of the
theoretical sources of the conflict and gives voice to the practical
ramifications of the logical outcomes of these theoretical
approaches, it does not identify the conflict and provides no
guidance to resolve it.2
This intellectual legacy produced two philosophical outlooks
bearing on the treatment of speech.3 Their irreconcilable
* Adjunct Professor, Lincoln Law School, Attorney, Carmel, California,
J.D. University of California, Hastings College of Law, 1987; B.A. Political
Science, B.A. Legal Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1983.
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. One student of the shift in free speech thought, observing the absence of
analysis relating to how the accepted doctrine for protecting First Amendment
activity pertains to the objective of achieving social equality, has remarked
that "[c]ontemporary libertarian theory largely ignores the mixed questions of
expression and economics presented by such issues as campaign finance
reform and access rights to mass media." MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING
FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 2 (1991).

3. As will be seen, one justified uninhibited free speech as instrumental to
the overarching public good of facilitating the informed and free process of
self-governance. Another justification restricted certain speech in the name of
the public good to prevent the disparate impact upon the political process by
large agglomerations of individuals or of private wealth. The first, a
"marketplace" rationale for free speech that came to provide the starting point
for judicial analysis just prior to the 1920s, was essentially a classical liberal
individual rights protective paradigm. This free enterprise approach found
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differences are illustrated in the Citizens United case. 4 As is so
often the case in democratic systems, the conflict, distilled down to
its essence, balances concerns of social equality versus claims of
individual autonomy. How these concerns are expressed within the
framework provided by constitutional jurisprudence is what bears
examination.
The Supreme Court's "Hillary Tape" split decision was
marked by a battle over the question of how to treat electionrelated speech by corporations.5 The majority regarded corporate
speech, in terms of free speech doctrine, as logically
indistinguishable from any other associational speech and entitled
to the same protection against government regulatory efforts as
any other political speech:
When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal
law, to command where a person may get his or her information or
what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to
control thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms
the freedom to think for ourselves. 6
The minority cast political speech by corporate entities as
posing a gross impediment to the integrity and fairness of the
democratic process, and therefore, presenting a proper subject for
regulatory restriction.7 "[Tihe Government has a legitimate
interest in 'regulat[ing] the substantial aggregations of wealth
amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate
form,'. . . . [T]hose aggregations can distort the 'free trade in ideas'
itself at loggerheads with the very ideological perspective that had spawned it
and with the second justification that regarded it as necessary to regulate the
social structure to achieve an equalizing of access to the political process and
fairness in its function.
4. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 908. The majority's opinion is hardly anchored in libertarian
rhetoric concerning the "inalienable rights" of individuals. Id. at 876-917. This
would have an awkward application to artificial entities, although these
fictitious beings are perceived by the Court as embodiments of the
associational rights of individuals, uniting to advance their individual speech
interests. The thrust of the opinion justifies free speech in terms of its
importance to the electorate: "On certain topics corporations may possess
valuable expertise, leaving them the best equipped to point out errors or
fallacies in speech of all sorts, including the speech of candidates and elected
officials." Id. at 912.
The Government has "muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most
significant segments of the economy." And "the electorate [has been]
deprived of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function." By
suppressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and
nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from
reaching the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are
hostile to their interests.
Id. at 907 (citations omitted).
7. Id. at 917-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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.8
crucial to candidate elections . ...
The foregoing differences in approach that came to a head in
Citizens United have been brewing in free speech jurisprudence
since the beginning of the last century. Recent campaign reform
law jurisprudence became a focal point for the conflict and the
resultant illogic; and the Supreme Court's treatment of this area
has been a growing cause of concern.9 Considering that the conflict
poses an impending crisis of modern libertarian theory, it is
surprising that most scholarly discussion of free speech issues
entirely misses the point.10
On the one hand, the Citizens United majority opinion
expanded first amendment protection to allow all private voices to
participate in the marketplace of ideas, thereby theoretically
increasing public access to more perspectives concerning
important public issues." On the other hand, the minority decried
that approach as skewing the political process unfairly in favor of
entrenched powerful interests that tend to have private economic
gain rather than the commonweal as their primary motivation in
speaking out on issues.12 The majority's approach is characterized

8. Id. at 955 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. GRABER, supra note 2, at 197-198. See generally, Richard L. Hasen,
Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court's Deregulatory Turn in FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064 (2008) (noting that "[s]ince
1976, the Supreme Court's approach to campaign finance law has swung like a
pendulum . . . ."); Nathaniel Persily, Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the
Supreme Court's Recent Election Law Decisions, 2008 SUP. CT. REVIEW 89
(2009) (discussing the many recent Supreme Court decisions); Timothy
Sandefur, What Partof 'No Law' Don't You Understand?: Getting Government
Out of the Politics Business, 12 NEXUS 135 (2007) (concluding that political
speech is too important to allow the government to interfere with it).
10. GRABER, supra note 2, at 13. Graber observes:
Today, the most important First Amendment issues facing American
society concern the ways that disparities in economic resources affect
access to the marketplace of ideas. Since 1973, major cases before the
Supreme Court have explored the extent to which owners have a
constitutional right to control the expressive uses of their holdings.
Nevertheless, contemporary civil libertarians, working within the
tradition invented by Chafee, continue to place these problems on the
outskirts of theory. Such prominent defenders of free speech as Thomas
Emerson and Norman Dorsen rarely discuss the constitutional status of
campaign finance reforms, corporate speech, and speech rights that
depend on access to private resources; for example, they only briefly
analyze the right to hand out political leaflets in a privately owned
shopping center otherwise held open to the public. Rather, their works
and other contemporary discussions of the general theory of the First
Amendment continue to emphasize the relationship between speech and
lawless conduct, even though there has been little significant repression
of this sort over the past twenty years.

Id.
11.
12.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876-917.
Id. at 917-29.
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as distorting the process in numerous ways beyond pluralist
consequences contemplated by the Founding Fathers.13 This
ranges from the drowning out of important minority perspectives
by means of overwhelming advertising campaigns or
monopolization of the media to rendering political candidates
beholden to these powerful interests for their financial support.
Remarkably, both perspectives have common roots in first
amendment jurisprudence.
II.

THE FOUNDERS' UNDERSTANDING OF THE RIGHT OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH

A.

The Basis for Free Speech Rights

The classical liberal perspective that pervaded the thinking of
the Founding Fathers draws from a natural law tradition that
conceives of fundamental principles.14 These principles, familiar to
any political philosophy student, accept a priori the individual as
rational and autonomous and free. Thus, the individual is selfdetermining and endowed with the quality of reason and it is
entirely up to him or her to decide what freedom to retain and
what to give up. In other words, the individual inherently and
exclusively has the right to determine if and to what form of
government to cede power. This is conceived as occurring by
means of a hypothetical social contract. By virtue of this contract,
the compacting individuals have the right to choose selfgovernment.' 5 Self-governance may involve delegating power to
representatives to make decisions within the scope of delegated
power allowed. Because of the innate desire to expand power that
affects all members of mankind, the system must be structured
with devices to check any government, once empowered, from
exceeding its limited purpose and to prevent factions from
trampling on those individual rights not ceded to the State.' 6
Certainly the Founders appreciated the significance of free
speech for self-governance. It was intrinsic to their thinking that
the process of delegating power in self-governance by electing
representatives and making fundamental policy decisions and
maintaining accountability requires an informed populace free to
discuss issues openly and arrive at reasoned decisions.' 7 And the
distrust of aspects of pluralism-political parties and emerging
13. Id. at 876-917.
14. See STEVEN HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HuMAN DIGNITY 7-22 (2008)
(discussing the philosophical milieu of the Founders).
15. See, e.g., Gary L. McDowell, The Explosion and Erosion of Rights, in
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 18, 18-35 (Bodenhamer and Ely ed.,
2008) (analyzing, thoroughly, the history of individual rights and liberties).
16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
17. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-277 (1964).
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corporate power-as posing a factional threat to the AntiFederalists' conception of majority rule was certainly expressed.' 8
Nevertheless, the bases for the rights to petition and free speech
were not tied by the Framers to such instrumental values, but
purely and simply to the principled sense of liberties with which
all individuals are graced by virtue of god or nature and that were
not contracted away.
This perspective on the basis for free speech actually gained
little traction with the courts before adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.19 In the eyes of the courts, the miniscule claims of
rights by individuals failed to compare favorably when weighed
against the good of the entire commonwealth. 20 When the
Fourteenth Amendment finally became a vehicle to apply
individual rights guarantees to the states, the concept had come to
21
present more of a danger for liberal thinkers than a protection.
The fundamental rights approach was largely regarded as
insulating from reform all manner of commercial conduct that
22
unjustly exploited the gap between powerful and powerless.
Liberals declined to dignify and lend validation to a legal analysis
perceived as serving as a tool of oppression. 23 The classical liberal
approach declined in the constitutional horizon.24 A glint of it has
shone through from time to time, 25 but the Court has largely relied
upon justifications for free speech protection based upon its
significance for the exercise of popular sovereignty.
A different model would supplant the classical rights-based
18. The dissent in Citizens United details the Founders' concerns about
corporations consistent with their distrust of any locus of power in the political
structure. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906-907 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
20. DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS: 1870-1920 2376 (1997). Judicial hostility to libertarian free speech claims was manifested in
the application of the "bad tendency" test, which allowed suppression of any
speech tending to have deleterious consequences for the status quo. Id.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
22. GRABER, supra note 2, at 23-49.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. These cases generally implicate questions of individual autonomy much
more than speech. This was the case in the flag salute case with the following
recognition:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
Justice Douglas' eloquent elicitation of a layered protection of rights premised
upon the competing claims of the individual and the State has not been
accepted as the rationale for protecting speech. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
210-213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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approach. This new approach emphasized functional concerns and
de-emphasized the importance of the individual's innate autonomy
and liberty. This approach transposed upon free speech legal
thought an uneasy dichotomy between private economic activity
and speech. This distinction that emerged between commercial
conduct and expression failed to provide validation for regulatory
impositions upon economic activity that involves political speech.

B. The Common Law
The analytic antecedents of judicial recognition of First
Amendment petition and speech protections are traceable to the
discourse that emerged into a public sphere as a direct product of
the increasing emergence of corporate entities in the midseventeenth century. 26 The model for public discourse was set by
the structured private discussions of corporate shareholders
characterized by civility and responsible citizen self-governance. 27
The ancien regime declined and, in order to gain funds and allies
to stave off the grasping nobles, the king increasingly relinquished
power in the form of corporate charters to the rising bourgeoisie. 28
As a result, the standard of reasoned discourse as an essential
aspect of self-governance developed in corporate townships
throughout England. 29 Access to this process was not limited by
ancient notions of rank, but by more functional considerations of
the bourgeoisie, such as characteristics like knowledge, judgment,
and decorum compatible with serving corporate objectives. The
significance attached to public discourse involved departing from
ancient dictates of privilege and secrecy.30 Instrumental to the rise
of a new public sphere between the implacable authority of the
king and the domestic sphere were the appearance of the printing
press and the novel importance given an associational formcoffeehouses, salons, and public meeting places where private

26. The development of the impersonal and fictional entity of the
corporation was an awkward anomaly to the emergent western legal emphasis
upon personal responsibility. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS:
THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 11-18 (1975); Christopher D.
Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 452 (1972).
27. See generally Phil Withington, Public Discourse, Corporate Citizenship,
and State Formation, 112 AM. HIST. REV. 1016 (2007) (discussing "the
relationship between public discourse and corporate citizenship in early
modern England").
28. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 1-26
(1989) (titling Chapter 1: "Introduction: Preliminary Demarcation of a Type of
Bourgeois Public Sphere").
29. Id.
30. Id.
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citizens could freely discuss public affairs. 31
As a result of these social innovations, it became accepted
practice to seek to appeal to public opinion for acceptance of a
particular point of view on an issue. 32 This airing of points of view
emerged as a central feature of the political process and was
conceived, not merely as functionally self-validating, but as having
a protected place in the emerging liberal conception of the body
politic. The development of the normative sense of public
authority-imbuing public opinion with unprecedented power-that
emerged distinct from the sovereign's power in the public sphere,
was the precursor to the democratic political thought of Locke,
Montesquieu, and others, and ultimately to the modern liberal
State. 33 This development is where one finds the genesis of the
concept of a "marketplace of ideas."34 Out of the nascent public
sphere emerged the idea that public opinion, apart from raw,
positivistic manifestation of power by the king, was the source of
legitimate authority. This model, spawned from corporate
prerogatives, is one of a rational process of opinions competing for
acceptance against rival appeals in a free and open process of
public debate and is the seminal concept underlying the logical tie
relating public discourse to governance that would later come to
provide the primary rationale for judicial recognition of first
amendment protections.
The scholarship of Leonard Levy has enlightened us as to the
limited understanding accorded the meaning of freedom of speech
at the time the Bill of Rights was ratified. 35 This original
understanding of freedom of speech left it to the states to
individually determine the extent to which citizens were free to
speak 36 and, far from establishing an absolute freedom from
federal restrictions, merely accepted the common law
understanding. Specifically, this was understood to preclude prior
restraints, but not to exempt speakers from liability for seditious
libel and other consequences for their speech.37
Levy, although later acknowledging that a vigorous press was

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See generally DAVID ZARET, ORIGINS OF DEMOCRATIC CULTURE:
PRINTING, PETITIONS, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN EARLY-MODERN ENGLAND
(2000) (discussing the historical origins of printing and printed communication
and their effect on public discourse in England).
34. See id. (discussing the inception of public discourse).
35. LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 176-248 (1960) [hereinafter LEVY 1];
LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 220-81 (1985) [hereinafter
LEVY 2].

36. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 243 (1833).
37. LEVY 1, supra note 35, at 1-17; LEVY 2, supra note 35, at 309-49.
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accorded significant leeway, 38 explained that the Framers of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights thought of freedom of speech in
terms of the common law understanding articulated by Sir
William Blackstone, whose Commentaries stated the English
common law and effectively transmitted this understanding to the
colonies. 39 Blackstone's statement on the colonial concept of free
speech did not entail freedom from liability, only freedom from
prior restraint:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
State: but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter
when published. Every free man has an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this is to destroy
the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own
temerity. 40
He distinguished between prior restraint and subsequent
punishment when he wrote:
The liberty of the press . . . consists in laying no previous restraints

upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal
matter when published . .

.

. [T]o subject the press to the restrictive

power of a licensor is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the
prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible
judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and
government. But to punish (as the law does at present) any
dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a
fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is
necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of
41
government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty.
The common law understanding represented in the First
Amendment reference to "freedom of speech" articulated by
Blackstone did not include statements that were "blasphemous,
immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous
libels."4 2 The speaker could still be punished or held civilly liable

38. This has been explained as a "disconnect" between the official
statement of the law and its actual application. Stewart Jay, The Creation of
the First Amendment Right to Free Expression:From the Eighteenth Century to
the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 785 (2008).
39. LEVY 2, supra note 35, at 12-13. Another aspect of the common law

understanding, not pertinent here, is reflected in the colonial departure in the
Alien and Sedition Act from English law by providing that truth in speech
should be a defense. HEYMAN, supra note 14, at 10-11. David S. Bogen, The
Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97,
122, 146 (1982).
40. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 150-

152 (reprint 1992).
41. Id.
42. Id.

2010]

The Transformation of Freedom of Speech

77

for all sorts of speech, including seditious statements.43
How did we get from the foregoing common law
understanding of free speech rights to the more protective
understanding and the conflict represented by Citizens United?
Today, the first amendment is applied to the states as well as the
federal government and is regarded as insulating citizens from
more than prior restraint, including what were regarded at
common law as seditious statements, blasphemy, immoral, and
schismatical remarks. How was the Court's understanding of
freedom of speech so tremendously transformed?

C. Peeling the Layers of the Onion
Tracing the evolution of First Amendment doctrine involves
analyzing and understanding the influence of significant historic
events, intellectual trends, and the force of prominent legal
thinkers coalescing within the framework of the law. We will start
by examining significant legal developments that impacted judicial
treatment of rights, including free speech.
After the Civil War, the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth
Amendments were ratified (1868).44 These amendments were
designed primarily to protect blacks freed from slavery in the
southern states.45 But by their terms they also protected white
Republicans, carpetbaggers, Catholics, Jews, etc. In addition to
specifying that a citizen is anyone born or naturalized in the
United States, the Fourteenth Amendment protected persons or
citizens with three clauses: (1) The Privileges or Immunities
Clause; (2) The Due Process Clause, and (3) The Equal Protection
Clause. 6 The Privileges or Immunities Clause sought to extend
basic federally recognized civil rights protection to citizens vis-avis the states.47 It would have extended the protections of the First
Amendment, prohibiting not merely Congress, but state
government agents as well, from restricting First Amendment
rights. Not only does the plain language of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause have this import, but the history of the
amendment makes plain that its objective was to impose the
43. Levy explains that the colonial understanding was that protection was
afforded the speaker in the form of jury nullification as illustrated by the
famous 1735 case of John Peter Zenger in which the jury disregarded the
court's instruction in the law to find the publisher not guilty of seditious libel.
LEVY 2, supra note 35, at 37-47, 129-30. The obvious problem with this method
of protection is that it only affords protection when the jury is receptive to the
speaker's message. The unpopular speaker who espouses views not
appreciated by the jury would not fare as well as Zenger.
44. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV-XV1.
45. Id.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. See id. (noting "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.").

78

The John MarshallLaw Review

[44:69

federally adopted civil rights upon the states.4 8
But with The Slaughter-House Cases,49 the Supreme Court
commenced the process of gutting the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.50 Although the Court's ruling-upholding the governmental
police power to regulate slaughterhouse practices that posed a
plain public health hazard5 1-hardly required it to do so, the Court
went out of its way (in rejecting the butchers' claim that the
regulations infringed their constitutional right to contract) to also
find that the Privileges or Immunities Clause merely (and
redundantly) covered the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship (such affairs as are the province of the federal
government, such as the right to travel amongst the states and to
be protected on the high seas). 52 The Court rejected the argument
that the Fourteenth Amendment extended the protection of the
Bill of Rights to all state citizens and treated it as limited to
protecting and redressing the suffering of former slaves. 53
For those, like the members of the increasingly powerful
Progressive movement, seeking some mechanism to reform free
market excesses such as the problem with New Orleans'
slaughterhouses, the message was clear: Legislative efforts to
regulate private conduct that harmed the commonwealth were
having some effect. But efforts to obtain judicial support of civil
rights were being given short shrift. The court process was not
going to provide the answer the Progressives sought to rein in
industrialists' gluttony and improve the conditions of the
downtrodden. Government regulation seemed to provide the path
to success.
The Cruikshank54 case finished the job of gutting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause by explicitly holding that it did
not incorporate the First and Second Amendments as to the
states.5 5 Only later would the Court seek to replace the guts of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause by developing the oxymoronic

the
Second Amendment,
The
Friedman Goldstein,
48. Leslie
Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), United States v. Cruikshank (1876), 1 ALB.
Gov'T L. REV. 365, 374-377 (2008).
49. The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
50. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: What's So Wicked About Lochner?, 1
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 325, 331-32 (2005).
51. The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. at 36. New Orleans
slaughterhouses were dumping offal into the waterways causing serious
health and sanitation problems. RONALD M. LABBE AND JONATHAN LURIE,
THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES 1-16 (2003). Louisiana responded by
establishing a slaughterhouse monopoly to address the need for sanitation
reform. Id.
52. Id. at 209-10, 216-20, 225, 228 n.63.
53. The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. at 36.
54. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
55. Goldstein, supra note 48, at 369.
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substantive due process doctrine.5 6 That doctrine awkwardly
sought to achieve the same result that ought to have been
accomplished by the Privileges or Immunities Clause by means of
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 7 Because these clauses were not designed to
accomplish the conferring of substantive federal rights to state
citizens, their application has proved inadequate as a means of
doing so. One scholar has described the awkwardness as follows:
As a result of the Slaughter-House Cases, then, the entire
Fourteenth Amendment was distorted as the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses were stretched beyond their original meaning to
restore a portion of the original meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Consequently, the use of the Due Process
Clause in this manner has been vulnerable to historical claims of
illegitimacy from its inception during the Progressive era until
today. Not only has this shift in meaning undermined the legitimacy
of protecting the rights of individuals from violation by state
governments, it has also become a potent weapon against the
practice of originalist constitutional interpretation. To the extent
that distorting the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses in this
way is thought to be morally desirable, indeed essential, the moral
imperative of this distortion provides a powerful argument against
adhering to what is made to look like a morally inferior original
meaning.58

The upshot of The Slaughterhouse Cases and Cruikshank was
that an individual rights-based First Amendment jurisprudence
that might have flowered prior to World War I did not. And by the
time the Great War rolled around, the surrounding nationalistic
fervor presented a poor climate for constitutional rights challenges
to the new wartime federal statutes broadly targeting antiauthoritarian activity.
David Rabban's study of the First Amendment59 takes issue
with the idea that national concern with the right to free speech
was stagnant following the expiration of the Sedition Act of 1798
until the 1917 Espionage Act and 1918 Sedition Act were enacted
to suppress opposition to the First World War.60 Rabban reveals
56. James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the
Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 318-19 (1999);
GRABER, supra note 2, at 35-36.
57. Barnett, supra note 50, at 331-32.

58. Id. at 332. Barnett, like many scholars and some Supreme Court
Justices, would like to see The Slaughter-House Cases reconsidered and
reversed. Id.
59. See generally RABBAN, supra note 20 (discussing judicial hostility to
radical, libertarian speech proponents prior to World War I).
60. Id. See also MICHAEL K. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING
PRIVILEGE:" STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY

2-7 (Neal Devins ed., 2000) (questioning the freedom to challenge anti-war
protests during the Civil War). In his book, Curtis focuses on struggles for
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that there were numerous controversies surrounding the social
debate preceding the heavy-handed suppression that occurred
during WWI.6 1 The bitter opposition to the Civil War pitted
agitators against government suppression. 62 Activists throughout
the labor movement, in particular the International Workers of the
World (IWW or Wobblies), pressed the limits of suppression and
the issue of the right to free speech.6 3
In 1902, radicals founded the Free Speech League to combat
legislation restricting the rights of anarchists to promote their
views in the wake of President McKinley's assassination by an
anarchist. 64 The 1873 Comstock Act inspired opposition both in the
political arena and the courts. Abolitionist activity65 and the
suffrage movement 66 were also sources of controversy over the
extent of free speech rights. The struggle to repeal prohibition was
perceived as a battle for liberty-a question of individual
autonomy akin to free speech. In spite of a repressive culture and
a judiciary that remained unreceptive to the claim of a right to
dissent, these sources of social discontent made headway in
impressing the concept that government could not prevent
unpopular speech into the public consciousness.
What characterized the justification for free speech prior to
the twentieth century remained the natural rights, social contract
rhetoric of the revolutionary era of the Founders. Free speech, like
other individual rights involving autonomous acts that caused no
physical harm to other individuals, was solidly propped on both
universal principles and the literal language of the Bill of Rights,
which was now applicable to the states. This was an analysis of
the First Amendment steeped in Lockean natural law notions of
individual autonomy and liberty. It had the potential to flower
beyond its restricted common law understanding-to embrace an
understanding that precluded government from restricting or
freedom of speech during the time period from 1791 to 1868. Id. He analyzes:
(a) the controversy surrounding the 1798 Sedition Act and the question of
whether criticism of elected officials would have been protected speech, (b) the
battle against slavery and the question of freedom to challenge a perceived
social injustice, and (c) and the controversy over anti-war protests during the
Civil War. Id. at 52-79, 117-94.
61. See RABBAN, supra note 20, at 77-128 (dedicating an entire chapter to
the IWW free speech fights).
62. Paul Finkelman, Civil Liberties and Civil War: The Great Emancipator
as Civil Libertarian,91 MICH. L. REV. 1353, 1365-69 (1993).
63. See Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America's
"FirstFreedom," 1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557, 560-67 (1999)
(discussing the IWW organizers).
64. CHRISTOPHER M. FINAN, FROM THE PALMER RAIDS TO THE PATRIOT ACT
6 (2007).
65. CURTIS, supra note 60, at 155-93.
66. ELEANOR FLEXNER & ELLEN FITZPATRICK, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE
WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 241-68 (1996).
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penalizing speech-by the sheer force of the extension of its logic.
But the courts did not take the opportunity to embrace this
approach.
Another analytic construct rose to prominence and was
received with open arms instead; the perspective that emerged in
the early twentieth century was functionalist, emphasizing the
importance of free speech as a means to the end of achieving the
common good.67 The Progressives, who ultimately would press this
approach in the courts, consciously rejected the principles of the
Founders in favor of an organic perspective on the individual's
place in the social order6 8 and an unflagging faith that science
applied by bureaucrats should be the solution to social inequity.69
The following section identifies and traces the effect of the
significant forces responsible for this shift.
III. THE SHIFT TO A NEW LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH

A.

The ProgressiveMovement

The influence of the Progressive movement permanently
altered liberal conceptions regarding issues of freedom and
individual rights. The classical liberal emphasis upon private
property rights was left behind. The Progressives recognized the
glaring disparity between the classes that was a product of an
unrestrained treatment of individual autonomy. The old world
aristocratic distinctions had been replaced by a new hierarchy in
which the nouveau riche were far more rapacious and were no
longer bound by the sense of moral obligation that prevented
excesses under the old regime. A key device for increasing private
wealth to the detriment of workers and others was the
proliferating corporation. 70
67. GRABER, supra note 2, at 2, 17-45.
68. They would have accepted Rousseau's articulation of freedom over that
of John Locke. Id.
69. See generally THE PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTION IN POLITICS AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE: TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN REGIME (John Marini &
Ken Masugi eds., 2005) (explaining the impact of the Progressive movement).
The Progressives emphasized the science of Darwin as revealing a dynamic
process of social change throughout history. The emerging field of sociology
captured the Progressive imagination as well, and the emphasis upon society
as a biological entity in which individuals were interdependent organs
supplanted the Founders' emphasis upon the individual. Id. The notion that
the individual was paramount was rejected as antiquated in favor of a
conception that freedom, far from being inherent, is something that exists by
virtue of society and flows from the State. Id. From this perspective, the
individual stood in the path of social reform and, therefore, of greater freedom.

Id.
70. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876. Both members of the majority and
the minority in Citizens United recognized the explosive growth after the turn
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The Progressive movement arose from the ashes of the
Populist movement, a movement concerned with agrarian issues.
Paradoxically, the Progressives were composed primarily of
members of the middle class, yet sought protection for immigrants
and laborers. The general welfare was the movement's primary
concern. Initially, free speech did not really integrate into
Progressive designs for addressing this concern.7 1 In fact it could
tend to run contrary to Progressive objectives where it was
employed to oppose Progressive notions of the common good.
Secondary considerations, such as individual interests, that stood
in the way of a legislative determination should give way. This
inclination to discount individual rights in the face of
congressional, administrative, or judicial determinations of the
common good found judicial expression as the "bad tendency"
test.72
The Progressives valued diversity as instrumental to
achieving a unified polity. To the extent that this entailed open
discussion of disparate views as a process to finding common
ground, this meshed well with certain key free speech supportive
rhetoric.78 But the major motivation for Progressive support of free
speech, given impetus by the success of muckraking journalism,
was that as a practical matter speaking out against social injustice
was often the best means of effecting change. 74
A growing perception of industrialists' dissipation brought
concern that a far greater threat to human freedom was posed by
private forces than by government. The Progressives attacked the
notion that anyone had the right as an individual to relentlessly
accumulate wealth without regard for the damage done to othersto society. It was one thing to posit that everyone had this
opportunity and was protected equally in this right, but the reality
was that a tremendous inequality separated a privileged class
composed of wealthy and powerful individuals and corporations
from a class of laborers and the poor who were exploited and
unprotected from the ravages of those controlling the reins of
power in society.75 The Progressives took to heart the impact this
had upon the meaning of freedom.7 6
For the Progressives, the system created by the Founders had
of the century of the use of fictitious entities developing from the English
device-the Charter. Id.
71. GRABER, supra note 2, at 11.
72. Id. at 84-85. "If a doctrine had some tendency to cause social evils, then
the people had the constitutional right to forbid its advocacy." Id. at 85.
73. RABBAN, supra note 20, at 3.
74. See generally JOHN M. HARRISON, MUCKRAKING: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE (Harry H. Stein ed., 1973) (examining muckraking from the early
twentieth century to the present).
75. CURTIS, supra note 60, at 423-25.
76. Id.
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produced grave injustice and needed to be overhauled to equalize
opportunity so that everyone might enjoy meaningful freedom.
They pointedly addressed the peril to individual freedom posed by
a conception of individual liberty that permitted the powerful to
run roughshod over the powerless as a conception of freedom in
the abstract only.77 It was illusory78 for most persons who were
reduced to a meager existence of toiling endlessly to just put food
on the table and precluded from real opportunities by the avarice
of members of a small, exploitative class.79 In reality, only the rich
and powerful could enjoy freedom. The equal right to pursue the
American dream was beside the point for those unequally deprived
of real opportunity to exercise the right.
The impact of the Progressive movement upon legal thinking
was profound. It tremendously affected how courts treat individual
rights claims, including free speech. For reformist illuminati, the
importance of speech was not premised upon the sanctity of
individual rights, but upon its usefulness in facilitating positive
change for mankind.8 0 As distinguished from the Founders'
treatment of the right as something government may not interfere
with, the Progressives lent it no intrinsic positive value. Its value
as a force for positive change meant that it was essential to
regulate it to serve this all-important social purpose. Regulation to
achieve social good entailed assuring equality of influence for the
voters and financial equalization for candidates and ballot
measure supporters. 81 This perspective found its way into legal
analysis and has pervaded First Amendment reasoning for almost
a century. It was given voice in legislation enacted to address
perceived inequities in campaign finance practices. It is this
functional approach that we find wholeheartedly articulated by
the dissent in Citizens United, but only halfheartedly by the
majority. 82
77. See GRABER, supra note 2, at 53-65 (discussing theories related to the
New Libertarians).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The Progressives regarded the legal process very much in the manner

Oliver Wendell Holmes did. See discussion infra Part III.E-F (analyzing the
Progressive movement). This Realist bent meant that a broad social agenda
recognized by the Legislature and giving force to significant social needs
should override private rights concerns. Id. Thus, the Progressives, like the
Wobblies, initially considered free speech as a means to an end-achieving
improved working conditions and other social reform. Bobertz, supra note 63,
at 562.
81. Tiffany R. Jones, Campaign Finance Reform: The Progressive
Reconstruction of Free Speech, in THE PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTION IN POLITICS
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE: TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN REGIME 321-46

(John

Marini & Ken Masugi eds., 2005).
82. The majority in Citizens United accepts the functional aspect of speech
in terms of its supreme importance for the political process of self-governance.
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For a number of reasons, other than those already elaborated,
Progressives were not inclined to look to the courts to advance
their cause.8 3 The Progressive movement, like the IWW, was
internationalist in orientation. 84 As such, the Progressives were
not concerned with elucidating a rights theory based upon an
analysis derived from the legal documents legitimizing a single
national sovereign order. 85 Their principles derived from a much
broader understanding than the Constitution.8 6
The Progressives regarded government as a proper source of
policy for regulatory reform and equalization of inequities in the
world. Conversely, the courts were ill-equipped to engage in this
evaluation.87 As a practical matter, at this point the courts gave
short shrift to the free speech claims raised by the Wobblies,
anarchists and others, and it appeared Panglossian, to hold out
hope for legal cognizance of a speech protective outlook. Moreover,
the courts relied upon Constitutional rights to consistently rule
counter to Progressive efforts, utilizing legislation to curtail
economic abuses by private forces in the economic sphere. The
progress Progressives made in the courts after enactment of the
Interstate Commerce Clause toward extending State regulatory
power over businesses was eroded by a series of judicial decisions
commencing in the 1890s.8 8 Judicial cognizance of a rights-based
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886-917. But the majority rejects the idea that
the government may intercede to ensure that the process works fairly to
ensure the common good. Id. Contrary to Progressive principles, it leaves the
process to be self-regulating. See GRABER, supra note 2, at 48 (The classical
libertarian free speech proponents fulminating their individual rights
perspective after the Civil War were similarly disposed toward holding
contractual relations to be free from government interference.).
83. See discussion supra Part III.A.
84. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN
HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW 155-208 (2007) (discussing dominant
Progressive figures in the transformation of twentieth century American
rights consciousness).
85. Id.
86. Until at least the mid-1920s, civil libertarians generally justified
their defense of political speech by reference to social justice and the
broader good, as opposed to individual rights. When they did speak about
rights, they emphasized that true "civil liberty" entailed a positive right to
engage in government as social and economic equals-not simply a
negative right against interference with private behavior (Graber 1991).
In other words, for much of the 1920s, civil liberties still meant "freedom
to" (participate in government, bargain collectively, protest governmental
abuses) rather than "freedom from" (centralized government tyranny).
Laura Weinrib, From Public Interest to Private Rights: Free Speech, Liberal
Individualism, and the Making of Modern Tort Law, 34 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
187, 201 (2009).
87. See id. at 210 (noting many civil libertarians who believed that the
courts lacked the information and expertise to engage in this evaluation).
88. Arnold M. Paul, Legal Progressivism, the Courts, and the Crisis of the
1890s, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 495, 498-500 (1959). The courts in the 1890s dealt
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theory appeared to require acceptance of Lochner-based
recognition of the economic right of the powerful to exploit the poor
and working class and to utilize that freedom equipped with ample
wealth to make speech an effective weapon to counter Progressive
goals.89
Recognition of rights, therefore, did not necessarily work to
the advantage of the downtrodden and could easily inure to the
advantage of powerful forces opposing Progressive objectives. One
scholar observed the double-edge sword this presented and
indicated:
During the 1920s one could advocate civil liberties without
jeopardizing Progressive ideals in any significant way. Conservative
beneficiaries of civil libertarian protection during that decade, like
the Ku Klux Klan in Boston, were marginal actors who posed no
real threat to Progressive change. In the 1930s, however, as the
forces of government allied with labor in their struggle against
employers, defending civil liberties (for example, Henry Ford's right
to distribute antiunion literature without interference from the
National Labor Relations Board) often meant alienating the Left.
For the first time, pro-business, antistate conservatives appreciated
the conservative implications of free speech individualism.90
There was seemingly sound reason for Progressives to decry
and to seek to counter this perilous reliance upon constitutional
rights. Consequently, the Progressives looked to legislative and
administrative branches of government to advance their
objectives, including protecting speech rights.9 ' They perceived
government as an ally in this endeavor. 92
For the Progressives identifying the enemy was easy. At the
turn of the century widespread recognition of the excesses of
private power and corruption were prevalent. Grant McConnell
observed that muckrakers exposed corruption throughout society:
"a long list of individuals and institutions had been treated to
muckraking exposure: Carnegie, Schwab, Morgan, Vanderbilt,
Rockefeller, Armour, Swift, Harriman, Astor, grain exchanges, oil,
sugar, railroads, tobacco, packinghouses, banks, colleges,
churches, the press, labor unions, cities, states, and the federal
brutal blows to two of Progressivism's main agendas-destruction or close
control of the trusts and taxation of the large incomes. Id.
89. Bobertz, supra note 63, at 587.
90. Weinrib, supra note 86, at 203.
91. Id. at 201. Finan also describes how Progressives, like Roger Baldwin,
would seek to work with the War Department to help conscientious objectors
and to promote free speech goals. FINAN, supra note 64, at 20, 24, 44-53. To
modern day civil libertarians this is like expecting help from the enemy. It
seems bizarrely akin to asking the devil to turn down the heat in Hades so one
can make ice cream.
92. See Weinrib, supra note 86, at 201 (noting that the Progressives utilized
the government to further their objectives).
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government."9 3 The Progressive movement challenged private
power and countered it with a vision of the public good. But
identifying the public good was not as simple as identifying the
problems with society.94 McConnell recognizes this as the key
failure of the Progressive movement.9 5 The definition of the public
interest was lacking and the identification of what authority
should implement it was uncertain as well. This failure was
evident with respect to Progressive efforts to protect free speech.
Progressive efforts turned to the government to regulate
commercial activity in order to provide citizens with the resources
and independence necessary to enjoy freedom, including the
effective exercise of their free speech rights.96 But the Legislature
would betray the trust the Progressives invested in it to promote
the common good by passing the Sedition Act in 1917 and with
conscription policies that treated conscientious objectors harshly.
Regulatory agencies similarly dashed Progressive hopes by
serving to suppress speech regarded as benefiting the common
good. The interwar Progressives looked to bureaucratic expertise
to engineer appropriate mechanisms to address social injustice
and problems. Regulatory agencies were perceived as eminently
suited to scientifically carry out the public will and to effectively
counter instances of majoritarian excess.9 7 But disillusionment
with regulatory mechanisms grew as practice betrayed these
grand expectations. This became evident in the areas of
government regulation of matters of private morality and personal
taste-such as birth control, art, broadcasting, education, and
obscenity. Paradoxically, the Progressives began to recognize
regulatory agencies as a threat to freedom and became wary of the
growth of administrative power.9 8
93. GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 34
(1966).

94. The Progressives' main themes were to: (1) reign in or abolish trusts, (2)
regulate railroads and other public-service corporations, (3) protect workers
from unconscionable employers, and (4) impose both income and inheritance
taxes on the wealthy. Paul, supra note 88, at 496.
95. McConnell observes:
But in the transformation of the movement from one against evil to one
for good difficulties arose which the old righteous formulas of
denunciation would not resolve. What was "the greatest good of the
greatest number in the long run?" How should it be recognized? Who
should determine "the highest use?" Antipathy to private power was no
guide to the exercise of public power. Worst of all, a definition of positive
goals did not automatically derive from the denial of private goals. The
one was not the opposite of the other; virtue was not enough.
MCCONNELL, supra note 93, at 46.
96. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing the
Progressives' relationship with the government).
97. Weinrib, supra note 86, at 212.
98. Id. at 213.
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Reluctantly, Progressives would turn from statism to the
courts and make headway in getting the Supreme Court to accept
a functional approach to speech as serving the social good in terms
of supplying the "marketplace of ideas" and facilitating the public
process of arriving at the "truth." But, in doing so, the
Progressives accepted the double-edged sword. They were picking
up a weapon that might also be wielded by those agglomerations of
power the Progressives regarded as antithetical to the public good.
Another development forestalled harm to Progressive ideals
from that side of the blade. Headway was made in getting the
Court to extend deference to legislative evaluations of the need for
economic regulations.9 9 As will be seen, while this served in the
form of campaign regulations to limit corporate entities for
decades from using their economic clout to sway the electoral
process, the logical flaw ultimately would surface: Limiting speech
by certain associations was at odds with its functional
justification. Speech-and this includes spending money to
speak-even by large, fictitious entities representing numerous
individuals, could not be neatly relegated to the category of
economic regulations. The logic was irrefutable that keeping
certain private speech from the citizenry-no matter what the
source-in keeping with the theory, deprived the public of either
the "truth" or information to aid it in discerning the "truth." Such
limitations, therefore, did not comport with a vision of speech as
an overarching social good-an essential component of selfgovernance.
B. The ACLU
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), although of
Progressive ideological origin, due to historic developments came
to pragmatically embrace an individualistic rights-based
rhetoric.100 Ironically, this happened in order to achieve objectives
opposed to the concept of such individualistic constitutional
protections.
The American Union Against Militarism (AUAM) was
organized, by Crystal Eastman and others, to pursue an
internationalist, pacifist program. 101 America's entry into the First
World War, the resurrection of the Alien and Sedition Acts, and
accompanying paranoia and militarism forced Progressive
organizations to reassess how they could accomplish their
99. This emerged from the most famous footnote in judicial history, which
provided the seminal analysis behind the distinction between the rational
basis standard and the protective strict scrutiny standard applicable to
fundamental rights. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938).
100. Weinrib, supra note 86, at 193.
101. Id. at 193-94.
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objectives in a climate severely opposed to any activity that
threatened the war effort. 102 In 1917, Roger Baldwin, a young
pacifist who was highly connected and credentialed, volunteered
his services to Eastman, who was at that time executive secretary
of the AUAM.10 3 The war resulted in the AUAM being bombarded
with requests for assistance from conscientious objectors seeking
to avoid the draft. Baldwin worked with other pacifist
organizations to form the Bureau for Conscientious Objectors
(BCO), which became a division of the AUAM.104
At this point, a number of factors can be cited as contributing
to a shift in organizational focus away from an internationalist
theme and toward domestic rights issues. Baldwin did not share
Eastman's internationalist commitment.105 Efforts to cooperate
with and enlist government agents in protecting conscientious
and
objectors flopped badly.106 The AUAM's pacifist
internationalist agendas came under fire as disloyal in the hostile
and suspicious political climate.107 Baldwin, who came to head the
organization when Eastman became ill, channeled efforts toward
domestic rights issues. The political expediency of guising
protection of those opposing the war as a neutral policy of
protecting the civil liberties of all Americans became apparent as a
question of organizational survival. 08 As a result, the BCO was
renamed the Civil Liberties Bureau in the hope that this would
prove more acceptable to government critics. 09 This did not
succeed and the AUAM board severed ties with the Civil Liberties
Bureau, which in 1917 took on the new name of the National Civil
Liberties Bureau (NCLB) and would in 1920 be renamed the
102. Id. at 191-96.
103. FINAN, supra note 64, at 19.
104. Id. at 20.
105. WITT, supra note 84, at 155, 160, 206.
106. Finan describes Baldwin's misplaced confidence in assuming that
government agents would be receptive to protecting loyal, patriotic draft
resisters:
He felt sure that he would be able to influence high Washington
officials. Many of them were wellborn like him, and not a few of them
were former Harvard classmates. The Wilson administration also
included men like Secretary of War Newton Baker, who had been
leaders in the reform movement. Baldwin assumed that he shared
certain values with these officials; certainly no one wanted to see
conscientious objectors abused, and everyone agreed on the importance
of free speech. He did everything he could to assure them that he
wanted to cooperate with the government in resolving the problems
created by the draft . . .. Baldwin was certain that breeding, contacts,
and public relations would go a long way toward minimizing wartime
repression.
FINAN, supra note 64, at 20.
107. Id. at 20-21; Weinrib, supra note 86, at 193.
108. FINAN, supra note 64, at 21.
109. Id.
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ACLU.
The effect of this transition was to reshape the organizational
image from one pursuing a suspect agenda of internationalist
governance to a sanitized and unassailable one dedicated to
neutrally protecting American rights.11 0 An inevitable consequence
of this reformulation was that free speech, which had previously
been regarded as of functional and secondary significance to the
greater objective of achieving the social good, was resituated and
enshrined as the organization's primary goal and came to be
defended and promoted as a good in and of itself.
Progressive agendas continued to control ACLU analysis of
free speech issues. From its founding, the ACLU made it a policy
to not handle cases involving morals issues such as obscenity
because it regarded such matters as involving individual, rather
than social issues.'11 The organization's Progressive ideals left it
inclined to accept government regulation of personal expression in
the name of the greater public good.112 But it would reposition to a
perspective strongly protecting individual matters of choice
against governmental forces seeking to impose official views of
morality upon the nation. Ten years after its founding, the ACLU
accepted the role of protecting "non-political" speech. Progressive
thinkers had begun to reevaluate the role of the State as the
arbiter of morality and the value of individual expression as a
mechanism for developing moral consensus as well as political
truth. This thinking prevailed upon the organization's leadership
to branch out into censorship issues.113
The ACLU's activity in this regard served to catalyze the
widespread public acceptance of an ideology incorporating
individual free speech rights as essential and of overarching
significance for a cohesive American way of life. The sensational
Scopes Monkey trial, pitting the evangelical William Jennings
Bryan against the atheistic Clarence Darrow, captured the
nation's attention and brought home to Americans the desirability
of protecting matters of individual conscience from the intrusive
meddlings of those microcephalic forces in society who would
dictate what people can and cannot learn.114 Another prominent
110. WITT, supra note 84, at 201-207.
111. Laura M. Weinrib, The Sex Side of Civil Liberties: United States v.
Dennett and the Changing Face of Free Speech, LAW & HIST. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3) [hereinafter Weinrib forthcoming].
112. RABBAN, supra note 20, at 304-16.
113. Weinrib forthcoming, supra note 111, at 17-22.
114. Finan covers the impact of the 1925 Scopes trial in detail. FINAN, supra
note 64, at 62-68, 95, 97. Finan observes how the case allowed civil
libertarians to place the issue in the context of a broader, eternal battle for
man's right to think freely. Id. The Scopes case brought home the danger of
extinguishing the individual freedom that kindles expression of novel ideas
and the frailty of free speech in a system dominated by smothering
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legal case involving the sex education pamphlet of suffragette and
birth control activist Mary Ware Dennett underscored for the
nation the danger posed to personal freedom by overzealous
government bureaucrats. The case represented a departure for the
ACLU from its prior policy of only involving itself in political
speech cases.115
Popular receptiveness to the positions taken in these cases
resulted in the ACLU taking more cases protecting individual
conscience. Philosophically the move was not easy for the
Progressive-oriented organization to make. As indicated, 116
Progressives regarded rights not as deriving from fundamental
natural law principles of individual reason and autonomy.
Diversity was not regarded as intrinsically necessary for the
democratic process of governance by the People, but as an
important means to effect valuable social change. Once social
betterment was accomplished, the Progressives saw no more need
for critics. Flux was not regarded as a permanently desirable state
of social existence. The individual was biologically a component of
and naturally subservient to the needs of the social body and a
healthy stasis was what was desirable. Deviations from cultural
uniformity were counter to the general will of the social body as
identified by government authorities.
But intolerance of deviations from the cultural mainstream
through government suppression came at some point after World
War I to be regarded not just as obstructive of forces for positive
change, but as placing an unwarranted and hazardous trust in
government.11 7 The Progressives, not unlike the Founders, had
come through experience to distrust government as a shepherd to
enlightened positive social regulation and, instead, to perceive it
as posing a threat to their conception of freedom.
The individual morals cases and accompanying publicity
fostered a new perspective on the part of the general public
regarding the significance of free speech. This provided a more
palatable analytical starting point-much more readily identified
with by mainstream Americans-than abstract concepts imparting
majoritarian forces in a way that resonated with personal concerns of a broad
spectrum of the American public. Id.
115. United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 565 (2d Cir. 1930). Weinrib
identifies the popularity of the ACLU's success in the Dennett case as
instrumental in: motivating the organization to move beyond political speech
cases to the realm of "cultural expression," and achieving widespread public
acceptance that protecting free speech was fundamentally important. Weinrib
forthcoming, supra note 111, at 5-6. She concludes that the case "introduced
the possibility of a free speech agenda premised on personal autonomy, a
cause that resonated strongly with mainstream Americans, rather than
political equality, which polarized them." Id.
116. See supra pp. 79-80 (examining the Progressive movement).
117. Weinrib forthcoming, supra note 111, at 202-203.
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value to protecting the rights of distasteful individuals such as
Klan members and revolutionaries. The vernacular had
mainstream appeal. The significance of protecting individual
autonomy became associated as an essential corollary of free
speech.118

So the worm turned. Ironically, the ACLU born of an
ideological movement that favored government regulation of
speech in the name of the common good found its own speech
curtailed by the provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA).119 That the ACLU has shaken loose from its Progressive
moorings is most abundantly clear from the fact that it submitted
an amicus curiae brief in Citizen United on behalf of the
Appellant, Citizens United-arguing against government
regulation of corporate speech to ensure political equality. 12 0
C. World War One and ProgressiveDisillusionment with Judicial
Protectionof Speech
As noted, the Progressives were internationalist in
orientation and objected to embroilment in the squabbles of
national entities. America's entry into World War I was marked
domestically by massive public opposition and protest. The heavyhanded suppression of anti-war dissent by self-appointed and
quasi-government private agencies and by the government under
the Espionage and Sedition acts was followed by remarkable
judicial spinelessness in protecting even the most innocuous
speech. Three Supreme Court decisions devastated the aspirations
of contemporary liberal civil rights proponents.
118. See FINAN, supra note 64, at 96-97 (describing prosecutions targeting
upstanding figures who were trying to achieve something positive and with
whom the general public could identify). It seems folks were more peeved at
the pretentious assertion that they should not be allowed to hear or look at
certain things than the idea of shutting up some irritating, loud-mouthed
radical. Id. The notion that rather than making up their own minds some
government authority or self-appointed moral vigilante could say what they
ought to look at or listen to galled the American public, and presented
something its members could empathize with far more than the scenario of
government suppressing some dissident who was disruptive and most folks
disagreed with anyway. Id.
119. The 2002 amendment to FECA sought to curb the use of soft money and
the use of "issue advocacy" advertisements to indirectly support the campaigns
of federal candidates. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. §§
441i, 441k, 441a-1, 438a, 510 (West 2002).
120. The ACLU argued that McConnell should be overruled and that Section
203 should be declared facially unconstitutional. Brief for the American Civil
Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae supporting Appellant, Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2009), 2009 WL 2365203, at *2-*3. The ACLU also
strongly suggested that Austin should likewise be overruled and argued "that
there is no precise or predictable way to determine whether or not political
speech is the 'functional equivalent' of express advocacy." Id. at *2.
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Schenck v. United States121 unanimously upheld the
Espionage Act of 1917 against a First Amendment challenge by
socialists convicted of violating its terms by passing out leaflets
objecting to the draft.122 In Schenck the Court first articulated the
"clear and present danger" test in a manner emphasizing that
protection of speech was far from absolute and as permitting the
government in that case to impose criminal liability for the
distribution of leaflets opposing the draft. 123 Frohwerk v. United
States124 unanimously upheld the conviction of German
immigrants charged with violating the Espionage Act by
publishing a newspaper containing articles opposing the war.125
Debs v. United States126 unanimously upheld the conviction of
socialist presidential candidate, Eugene V. Debs, for a speech
stating his personal opposition to the war, approving of the
activities of those convicted for aiding and abetting nonregistrants, and telling the audience they were "fit for something
better than . . . cannon fodder."127 The Court, treating the "clear

and present danger" test as encompassing the expression of
sentiments that merely had the "tendency" to obstruct recruiting
activity, made it apparent the test it was applying implicated
conduct that posed an unclear and remote danger.128
Disappointment was all the more profound because the
decisions were authored by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,129 who
was regarded as sympathetic to Progressive ideals and supportive
of efforts to reign in the abuses of private power.
D. The Impact of Legal Realism: Justice Holmes
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who authored the decisions in
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs was a towering legal force. 30 In
1881, he had published "The Common Law," which marked a
departure from parochial "inside the box" legal analysis that
regarded judicial decisions as inevitable products of formulaic
calculations involving application of established legal rules
analogized to the particular facts of a case.'13 He rejected the
121. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
122. See id. at 47-48 (upholding the Espionage Act of 1917).
123. See id. at 52 (articulating the "clear and present danger" test).
124. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
125. Id. at 204-06.
126. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 211-12 (1919).
127. Id. at 211-12, 214.
128. Id. at 211.
129. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 204; Debs, 249 U.S. at
211.
130. Id.
131. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881). Holmes
famously remarked that to discern the law one must place oneself in the
position of the bad man. Id. at 392-93.
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notion that the process was purely one of deductive reasoning.132
The logical process took a back seat to overriding pragmatic
considerations related to the power relations in society. The life of
the law was not logic, but experience.133 For Holmes the process
involved far more significant factors outside the box.134 He
emphasized that judges' decisions, in actuality, derived primarily
from their personal experiences and from what they personally
believed was socially desirable. 3 5 These beliefs that established a
judge's mindset were not the product of rigorous legal training, but
like all value judgments, were tied to the judge's particular
upbringing and other environmental considerations. 136
Legal rules, both in their substantive and procedural aspect,
were not fixed in time, but were malleable and could be molded to
serve the practical needs of those forces driving society forward.
Legal prose, cast in a logical form, merely masked judges' true
guide: experience. Stare decisis was to be disregarded where
precedent no longer made sense in a new social context. Holmes, in
yet another pithy comment stated: "[i]t is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the
time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past."137
Holmes's cynical perspective, which came to be known as
Legal Realism, was highly positivistic. It gave no weight to
profound principles that purportedly underlie the law. Natural law
principles and transcendent moral truths were not the foundation
for legal principles. Instead, the Realist view espoused by Holmes,
which rose to become a prominent influence in legal analysis
throughout the early twentieth century, emphasized that the law
was force brought to bear by ascendant powers in society and
expressed "through the instrumentality of the courts." 38
Holmes's approach to legal analysis was not purely academic.
His willingness to give great weight to broad societal demands as
expressed by the Legislature and the great body of intellectual
thought is reflected in his legal opinions as well. His famous
dissent in Lochner v. New York-rejecting the Court majority's
132. Id.
133. Max Fisch, Justice Holmes, The Prediction Theory of the Law and
Pragmatism(1942), in PIERCE, SEMEIOTIC AND PRAGMATISM 6, 6-18 (Kenneth
Laine Ketner & Christian J.W. Kloesel eds., 1986).
134. Id.
135. Id. See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., American Jurisprudence
between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM.
HIST. REV. 424 (1969) (discussing Holmes's perceptions and ideas).
136. Id.
137. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897).
138. Id. at 457.
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acceptance of individual rights claims of corporate employers
seeking to protect their freedom to contract regarding wages and
hours from government regulation-is an apt example. 39 Holmes
would have upheld Congress's ability to legislate what it regarded
to be in the common good.140 This approach understandably won
Holmes the admiration of Progressive thinkers. In response to the
majority's willingness to champion private contract rights in the
face of the Legislature's assessment of the need for regulation,
Holmes retorted, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."141

Holmes's positivistic outlook was at odds with acceptance of
the Founders' principled approach to rights.142 Schenck, Debs, and
Frohwerk demonstrate Holmes's lack of commitment to individual
rights.1 43 They reveal his willingness to bow to what he perceived
from a Realist's perspective as social forces being brought to bear
to accomplish practical social ends.144 The analysis of Holmes's
majority decisions in Schench, Debs,. and Frohwerk followed the
view that the First Amendment merely embodied the common law
understanding of the meaning of freedom of speech as prohibiting
only government prior restraint.145 One was free to shout fire in a
crowded theater, publish seditious statements, and so on, but
remained liable-civilly and criminally-for the consequences.
The Court's application of the "clear and present danger" test,
developed in these cases, revealed that this was a standard that
139. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
140. See id. (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]t is settled by various
decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life
in many which we as legislators might think as injudicious.. .
141. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
142. H.L. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: FREE SPEECH AND
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 4-5 (1991).
143. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 204; Debs, 249 U.S. at
211. Graber observes with respect to the reaction of civil libertarians to
Holmes's failure to protect individual rights in Schenck, Debs, and Frohwerk:
American libertarians had no reason for surprise. Holmes had always
been the leading authority for the narrowest interpretations of the
constitutional meaning of free speech. He wrote the Court's opinion in
Fox v. Washington, which held that states could punish advocacy of
nudism. In other cases, Holmes rejected the good faith defense in libel
suits, insisted that persons had no right to speak on public property, and
suggested that the First Amendment merely rendered constitutional
Blackstone's rule of no prior restraint. Furthermore, no progressive
jurist had developed a broad constitutional defense of expression rights
that was consistent with Holmes's dissent in Lochner v. New York, a
dissent that claimed "the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant
opinion."
GRABER, supra note 2, at 107.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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gave full sway to government suppression. As applied, it really
amounted to an elaboration of the Court's "bad tendency" test,146
rather than a protective requirement that the speech at issue pose
a definite, extreme, and immediate threat of harm.147
Less than a year later Holmes would be dissenting and
arguing against conviction of the radical social malcontent in
Abrams v. United States.4 s His Abrams dissent was to prove far
more enduring and influential than the majority decision. In one
paragraph he expressed a new premise for protecting dissent,
extolling the beneficial function of the marketplace of ideas as a
device to allow the self-governing people to shop for political
truth.149 This sparse statement was met with adulation by civil
libertarians. Holmes was now praised for his judicious sensitivity
to civil rights concerns.150 In spite of Holmes's assertion that the
anarchist's literature posed no threat, the facts seem essentially
indistinguishable from the proximity of danger posed by the
speech involved in Schenck, Debs, or Frohwerk.15 If the critical
facts were the same and the same legal test was being applied,
why was the outcome different?152 A legal realist would
undoubtedly conclude that something had changed outside of the
box.
The traditional explanation for Holmes's turnabout has been
146. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 454 (1907).
147. The employment of loose, flabby, "weasel-word" terminology is nothing
novel in the parlance of legal tests. Prior to Schenck, Judge Learned Hand
articulated a tighter and more speech protective standard in Masses Pub. Co.
v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). In the case, Crystal Eastman's
brother was prosecuted for publishing a Marxist periodical, but the ruling was
reversed on appeal. Id. Hand's formulation required that the danger be both
definite and imminent, requiring direct incitement to illegal action rather
than a mere tendency to induce illegality. Id. at 537. This would not comport
with Holmes's proclivity to eschew verbiage that would cobble or confine the
dominant force in society from having its day. Holmes opted for language that
did not bind courts to immutable principles and that allowed sufficient laxity
to accommodate the political climate shaping national policy at any given
moment.
148. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
149. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
151. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 204; Debs, 249 U.S. at
211.
152. Bobertz describes Holmes's perspective: "[a]ccording to Holmes's preAbrams philosophy, speech was no different than other forms of human
activity, and it could be restricted by laws that 'correspond with the actual
feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong."' Bobertz,
supra note 63, at 571. What is unclear is whether this basic philosophical
outlook actually changed. See GRABER, supra note 2, at 110-12 (positing that
what actually did change was not Holmes's outlook, but his perception of
social conditions as demanding a less repressive approach to dissident
activity).
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painted as a process of intellectual persuasion and conversion to a
principled, moral view of the importance of speech pressed by
Brandeis and scholars such as Zechariah Chafee.s53 This
postulated epiphanous awakening1 5 4 by Holmes to an unpragmatic
and ahistorical analysis of speech deriving from a political theory
combining ideas articulated by John Stuart Mill with Spencerian
notions of social Darwinism 15 5 is not plausible. Holmes, the
intellectual giant and cynic who scoffed at the notion of individual
rights,156 is mischaracterized as becoming sensitized and
embracing such lofty ideals.157 More practical developments far
more consistent with Holmes's approach to the law offer a far
better explanation for the shift evident in Abrams.15 8 Indeed, the
quick turnabout in Holmes's approach can best be explained in
light of a rising awareness of pragmatic considerations concerning
the social implications of suppressing dissident speech.
Two much less high-minded factors can be identified as
influencing Holmes to shift his approach in the eight-month hiatus
153. See Bogen, supra note 39, at 98-99 (discussing the transition in
Holmes's outlook on free speech).
154. Id.
155. The influence of Mill and Darwin upon Holmes's thinking, like that of
so many of his contemporaries, is detailed by Bogen. Bogen supra note 39, at
113-22.
156. POHLMAN, supra note 142, at 12.
157. GRABER, supra note 2, at 7-8. Graber points to Holmes's acceptance of a
positivistic outlook on political power bordering on "might makes right" as
necessitating rejection of principled conceptions of individual rights:
Holmes's reluctance or unwillingness to offer free speech any
substantial or wholehearted protection followed from his fundamental
political belief that "the proximate test of good government is that the
dominant power has its way," a maxim he reiterated in the crucial
passages of both the Lochner and Gitlow dissents. Dominant power, he
stated, was established by "physical power," not by elections or
persuasion. "Truth was the majority vote of that nation that could lick
all others."
Because Holmes considered force the basis of sovereignty, he
maintained that the dominant forces of any community had the "right"
to remove any obstacle in the way of the present attainment of their
goals. Holmes thought that "no society has ever admitted that it could
not sacrifice individual welfare to its own existence." "Whenever the
interest of society, that is, of the predominant power in the community,
is thought to demand it," he declared, "the most fundamental right of
the supposed preexisting rights-the right to life-is sacrificed without
a scruple." In contrast to early civil libertarians, who consistently
emphasized that more speech would ameliorate social conflicts, Holmes
seemed to regard expression as ultimately worthless. "When men differ
in taste as to the kind of world they want," he wrote, "the only thing left
to do is to go to work killing."
Id. at 109 (footnote omitted).
158. See Bogen, supra note 39, at 98-99 (discussing the historic events
intervening between Schenck and Abrams).
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between Schenck, Debs, and Frohwerk and Abrams.15 9 One

provided the practical basis and the other the logical reasoning or
Chafee's
shrewd
Professor
legal articulation.160 First,
reinterpretation of the "clear and present danger" test as a speech
protective standard spun dross into gold.' 6 Second, a new
perspective emerged that rapidly advanced and pervaded media
and intellectual thinking of the day, launching a drastic
reevaluation of the effectiveness of suppression as a lasting, viable
technique for social control of dissident activity.162
E. Free Speech as an Essential "Safety Valve" to Relieve
Revolutionary Pressures

Prior to the First World War, the Wobblies had sought to tie
their outspoken efforts to secure better working conditions to
constitutional considerations.1 63 The courts were not receptive. But
progress was made through the IWW's efforts in convincing
regulatory authorities that suppression was not an effective
policy.1 64 In fact, confrontations with the Wobblies' tactics
convinced many officials that heavy-handed policies were selfdefeating and would terribly backfire, whereas pursuing a policy of
tolerance generally served to burn out or defuse the revolutionary
fervor. 65
After the war, the concern with controlling radicals and
preventing revolution was exacerbated by the specter of the
communist revolution that had swept Russia in 1917, becoming a
reality in the United States. The conclusions reached by those who
were unsuccessful at stamping out radical activity with a policy of
suppression before the war were confirmed by the experience
under the iron fisted czarist regime in Russia. There was a danger
inherent in employing intolerant and heavy-handed methods to
control dissentient elements in society. Just as a pressure cooker
159. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 204; Debs, 249 U.S.
at 211; Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624-30 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
160. See GRABER, supra note 2, at 107-08, 122, 178 n.115 (discussing the
reasons for Holmes's shift).
161. DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAN CHAFEE, JR., DEFENDER OF LIBERTY &
LAW, 18-31, 89-95 (1986).
162. Id.
163. Bobertz, supra note 63, at 563. An important theoretical undercurrent
emerged as regulatory agencies addressing the unrest and labor uprisings
before the war considered the parallels between suppression of the Wobblies
and the suppression of speech by the British as a precursor to the American
Revolutionary War. Id. at 563-64, 568, 574. The supposition was that
suppression intensified dissent and drove it underground to spread in secret.
After the Russian revolution, the analogy was made to czarist Russia's policy
of suppression of dissident speech. Id. at 572-77, 585.
164. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing pre-WWI and the
Wobblies).
165. Id.
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that provides no safety valve can explode, suppression of the
expression of radical sentiment only serves to turn up the heat.
The dissident forces, if not allowed to vent, will go underground,
fester, and eventually emerge with dangerous revolutionary force.
Free speech was reconceived as a mechanism for discharging and
dissipating such hostility and thereby maintaining social control
and the status quo.
Holmes's critics after the Schenck decision were not entirely
unconstructive. 166 Bobertz observes the criticism from one law
professor published in a national publication of some import:
Ernst Freund, a law professor at the University of Chicago,
criticized Holmes even more pointedly in an article published in The
New Republic. He wrote that the Debs decision represented "the
arbitrariness of the whole idea of implied provocation." The
"draconic sentences" imposed under a "crude piece of legislation"
were intended to silence political agitators through intimidation and
terror, Freund wrote. Instead of silencing radicalism, however, the
tactic would "merely serve to create animosity and bitterness with
reference to our processes of justice."
To identify Debs and his followers as felons, Freund declared, would
"dignify the term felony instead of degrading them." The social
impact of the Debs ruling would be to legitimize lawlessness and
public disorder, for "every thief and robber will be justified in feeling
that some of the stigma has been taken from his crime and
punishment." Freund noted that, by sanctioning repression, the
Supreme Court created "an enormous amount of dissatisfaction" and
strengthened "the forces of discontent." He warned that "in the long
run sound law cannot be inimical to sound policy." Although
government officials might believe that suppression stops rebellion
before it gathers steam, they were actually unleashing a "loose and
arbitrary law which at some time may react against [them]." Freund
concluded that "[t]oleration of adverse opinion is not a matter of
generosity, but of political prudence."16 7
The safety valve theme gained ground from that of an
abstract proposition. The weight of its argument increased in light
of recent world events and the failed practices of suppressing
dissident activity in Europe and czarist Russia. A series of highly
publicized 1919 outbreaks, strikes, and riots throughout the
nation, fanned the fears of communist revolution. 168 These
166. Bobertz, supra note 63, at 572, 594.
167. Id.
168. See Jay, supra note 38, at 840-43 (discussing the communist
revolution). Bobertz also describes the Red Scare. Bobertz, supra note 63, at
595-99. A citywide strike in Seattle in support of shipyard workers brought
national media attention to the imminence of Bolshevik uprising in the United
States. Id. at 595-96. Bombs addressed to numerous prominent national public
figures, including Holmes, were intercepted. Id. at 596. May Day
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outbreaks of social disorder following on the heels of Holmes's
decisions served to move the safety valve concept from the realm of
theory and to bring it much closer to home. The backlash
generated by a policy of suppression sanctioned by the Supreme
Court was looking very real indeed. "By the early 1920s, the safety
valve theory had gained widespread acceptance as a valid
rationale against the repression of free speech."169 Holmes would
pick up on this analysis and, with usual pithy eloquence, express it
as: "[wjith effervescing opinions, as with the not yet forgotten
champagne, the quickest way to let them get flat is to let them get
exposed to the air." 7 0
F. The Insinuationof ProgressiveDoctrine into JudicialAnalysis:
The Influence of Zechariah Chafee
At this juncture, a young Harvard professor eager to make a
name for himself took the revisionist tact with respect to Holmes's
"clear and present danger" test.171 Ignoring the reality of the test's
actual application in Schenck, Debs, and Frohwerk, Zechariah
Chafee applauded the test as speech protective.172 Trashing
Blackstone as an authority and inventing a false history of free
speech,173 he constructed new credentials and a new basis for a
policy of judicial protection of free speech. Most significantly, for
purposes here, Chafee provided a rationale for protecting dissident
speech, departing from the classical libertarian tradition and tying
it to its important social function.174 For Chafee, the right to free
speech was protected for its societal value, rather than as a right
inhering to the individual. 75 It was an elevated social interest

demonstrations and riots in cities throughout the nation turned ugly and
received attention from a media drawing parallels with the events preceding
the Russian Revolution. Id. at 596-97. Race riots attributed by the press to
Bolshevik activism occurred with deadly effect in cities throughout the nation.
Id. at 597."Imported Bolshevism also was blamed for causing the Boston police
strike, the steel strike, and the soft coal strike-the three 'great fall strikes' of
1919." Id. In the face of this dissent and turmoil, intolerance reared its ugly
head in the form of the formation of reactionary organizations such as the
American Legion and the expansion of existing groups such as the Ku Klux
Klan and in the form of proliferating legislation designed to suppress the
expression of views distasteful to the status quo. Id. at 572-573.
169. Bobertz, supra note 63, at 580.
170. JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES AND
UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 139 (Harry C. Shriver ed., 1936).
171. Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in Wartime, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932,
967-71 (1919) [hereinafter Chafee 1].

172. Id.
173. Chafee would persist in his historic revisionism later when he depicted
American political culture as highly tolerant of dissident voices in contrast to
Communist and Totalitarian regimes. Bobertz, supra note 63, at 581-82.
174. See infra note 180 (citing to GRABER and CHAFEE 2).

175. Id.
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deserving protection against all but competing social interests
posing a most "clear and present danger." 76
Chafee articulated an ideal of self-governance involving a
popular search for truth that is, by now, quite familiar to anyone
who has completed a basic civics course.1 77 Truth was portrayed as
a commodity competing in a marketplace of ideas alongside other
(untruthful) commodities. 78 Chafee expressed the Millsian ideas
concerning the need to protect unpopular speech and the utility of
such speech in facilitating the process of evaluating different ideas
by the electorate as a means to arriving at the truth. 79 If the
people are deprived of the opportunity to consider certain ideas
they might thereby be deprived of the truth entirely or at least
prevented from properly assessing the merits of other ideas
weighed against the merits of the suppressed idea.1so

More importantly, this model was intrinsically incompatible
with the organic concepts infusing Progressive ideology, but was
entirely compatible with the classical liberal concepts of autonomy
and rights understood by the Founders. The significance of
protecting free speech as a mechanism of social change reflected a
Progressive emphasis upon the public welfare. The social attribute
of speech was its indispensability for the commonwealth, not its
inherent value as an unrelinquished individual liberty.' 8 ' The
social value held paramount was the ascertainment of truth
through an evaluative process promoted by exposure to a variety

176. SMITH, supra note 161, at 967-71.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 168.
180. Chafee adhered to the Progressive ideal that economic matters were
appropriately the subject of government intervention and likewise the
regulation of public discourse to ensure that it did not conflict with other
important social interests. GRABER, supra note 2, at 150. This evidently would
entail government regulation to maintain meaningful discussion and access to
the truth in the marketplace of ideas. Id. Curiously, Chafee acknowledged that
government was a threat to the ascertainment of political truth when he
observed that the danger to the marketplace of ideas was "[j]ust as great
where the interference comes from corporations as when it comes from
government . . . ... ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS
COMMUNICATION: A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE

PRESS 545 (1965) [hereinafter CHAFEE 2]. Proper subjects of regulation
included commercial speech and obscenity since they involved only individual
interests. GRABER, supra note 2, at 144. The contradiction in regulating the
rights of some actors in the marketplace of ideas on the basis of economic
considerations is what the Court was left to grapple with in Citizens United.
181. Graber observes, "[C]hafee insisted that the Constitution primarily
protected the social interest in free speech, rather than the individual's
interest in self-expression." GRABER, supra note 2, at 125. But this
purposefully ignored the Founders' reliance upon a natural law, individualistic
basis for protecting a speaker's interest in spouting off. Id. at 143.
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of opinions hawking different representations of verity. 82 But the
analysis also represented a departure from Progressive rhetoric. It
did not accede social value to the promotion of diversity.183 And,
most significantly, it provided no solid footing to sanction
governmental regulation of the public discourse to ensure that this
process unfolded fairly. 18
Holmes's dissent in Abrams adopted both the revised, speechprotective "clear and present danger" standard and the
"marketplace of ideas" rationale for lending speech such
protection.18 5 The experimental nature of this search for truth was
tied to the constitutional concept of popular sovereignty. 8 6
The problem again came before the Court in Gitlow v. New
Yorkis7 and Holmes, joined by Brandeis, would again dissent from
the affirmance of the conviction of an anarchist publisher of a "Left
Wing Manifesto."sS The majority again stated the "bad tendency"
test allowing that the "State may punish utterances endangering
the foundations of government and threatening its overthrow by
unlawful means"18 9 because "a single revolutionary spark may
kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a
sweeping and destructive conflagration."19 0 Holmes, departing
182. See supra note 181 (noting Graber's observations about Chafee).
183. Id. at 112, 135.
184. While Chafee believed that meaningful exercise of free speech is
jeopardized by the advantaged manipulation of wealth, such as in the form of
corporations, just as it is by government intrusion, the marketplace model
does not provide a rationale for equalizing speech anymore than rights
analyses provide a rationale for leveling the playing field between big-box
chain stores and mom and pop shops. Id. at 125, 137.
185. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624-30. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
186. The key language of the dissent, joined by Louis Brandeis, is
minimalist:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we
have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect
knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless
they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
187. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 673.
189. Id. at 667.
190. Id. at 668.
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from the approach he took in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, argued
the speech protective approach to the "clear and present danger"
test pressed by Chafee and adopted in his dissent in Abrams.19e
The dissent paid a critical blow to the "bad tendency" test by
pointing out that it, in effect, criminalized the process of political
change generally. 192 The uprising called for by Gitlow was to occur
at some "indefinite time in the future."19 3 Like any idea cast into
the political maelstrom, if accepted by the "dominant forces" of
society, it was okay by Holmes.19 4
Holmes's dissents in Abrams and Gitlow ought not to be
taken as the Justice's signal that he was prepared to uphold
individual rights in the face of an expression of the will of the
"dominant forces" of society expressed in the form of a definite
legislative pronouncement of a social objective.195 Chafee met with
Holmes seeking to persuade him to reconsider Schenck, Frohwerk,
and Debs and shortly thereafter recounted: "I have talked with
Justice Holmes . .. but find that he is inclined to allow a very wide

latitude to Congressional discretion in the carrying on of the
war."196 It would appear that Holmes would have deferred to
Congress's direct statement that "bad tendency" speech was
banned.
Some years would pass, and the Court majority would again
iterate the "bad tendency" test in Whitney v. California.97
Brandeis wrote and concurred on the basis that Whitney had
failed to procedurally raise a First Amendment defense. 98 Holmes,
who had effectively trashed the "bad tendency" test in his dissent
in Gitlow, joined the concurrence.199 Brandeis took the opportunity
to attack the majority's crumbling "bad tendency" approach with a
stunning vision of the fundamental importance of freedom of
speech to a fluid process of democratic self-governance. 200 In doing
so, he articulated a speech-based concept of underlying principles
of democratic governance as though they had existed all along. 201
This perspective enhanced and developed Chafee's themes, linking

191. Id.
192. Id. at 673.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 667.
195. Gitlow, 286 U.S. at 672-73; Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
196. Letter from Zechariah Chafee to Justice Charles F. Amidon (Sept. 30,
1919), in SMITH, supra note 161, at 1, 2, 30.
197. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
198. Id. at 649.
199. Id. at 380.
200. Id. at 649.
201. But they had not. Jay, supra note 38, at 872-73. The age of the
Founders was actually highly intolerant of revolutionary speech. Id.
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them to the constitutional origins of the nation.202 This marked a
dramatic departure from Brandeis's prior rights analysis.
G. Reconciling the ProgressiveApproach to Regulation with the
Protectionof Individual Rights: Justice Brandeis
Justice Louis Brandeis joined in the unanimous majority in
Schenck, Debs, and Frohwerk.203 Brandeis was a Progressive and
no friend of corporations-inveighing against railroads, trusts, and
the "pathologies" of capitalism (the monopolies, inefficient
management, waste, repression, and insurgency). 204 He shared the
Progressive view that corporations should be regulated to protect
individual freedoms and had written expressing these views. 205
Significantly, he also shared the Progressive reluctance to rely
upon rights for such protection.
As we have seen, this jaded view of a rights-based approach
stemmed from the Progressives' experience with judicial cases
upholding corporate economic interests against efforts to protect
individuals, in particular, workers from exploitation. 206 Graber
explains Brandeis's deep-seated Progressive reluctance to uphold
individual rights against governmental priorities:

202. Bobertz observes:
The Whitney concurrence simultaneously accomplished two critical
feats. First, it reverberated with the themes that had animated the free
speech debate over the previous two decades: the destabilizing effects of
political repression; the notion that the open airing of ideas produces
"truth"; the "safety valve" or "venting" qualities of tolerance; and the
availability of counter-propaganda to defeat objectionable ideas . . .. The
second feat was perhaps even more dazzling. Although the concurrence
obviously expressed the ideas of its time, Brandeis packaged these ideas
in a manner that thoroughly obscured their origins. These ideas were
not of recent coinage, but were the core principles of "[tihose who won
our independence by revolution" and those who "amended the
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed." . .
. It was these brave souls, not Brandeis himself, who conceived the ideas
set forth in the opinion; and because they believed in them so strongly,
they amended the Constitution to enshrine them forever as timeless
principles of American liberty.
Bobertz, supra note 63, at 594.
203. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 204; Debs, 249 U.S. at
211.
204. Id. at 575.
205. Louis Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness: Miscellaneous Papers of Louis D.
Brandeis, in OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 120, 120133 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1995).
206. GRABER, supra note 2, at 101, 118. Likewise, Graber observes that
Brandeis was proclaiming that because speech was the same sort of right the
Court had committed to protect with private economic rights, then respect for
precedent required it to protect speech. Id. "The judicial obligation to respect
precedent, he concluded, overrode the otherwise superior logic of the new
constitutional attack on free speech." Id. at 118.
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In contrast to conservative libertarian jurists, Brandeis did not
think courts were authorized to safeguard individual freedoms. He
specifically contended that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment only limited the procedures that state governments
could use when they sought to deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property. 207
Obviously, in order for him to wholeheartedly embrace the
rights evident in the Whitney concurrence, something had to
change in Brandeis's thinking. 208 This change would impel him to
articulate a conception of American democracy in which speech
was fundamental. 209 Brandeis shared the view that unrestrained
capitalism would produce revolutionary sentiment and believed
that tempering these abuses would serve to defray backlash and
mollify radical elements and ensure continuation of the capitalist
order. 210 Brandeis, like other Progressives, preached what was
ultimately a policy of appeasement and assimilation. 211 He, like
Roger Baldwin, Chafee, and all leading Progressives came from a
comfortable middle class background and had every personal
inclination to preserve the existing distribution of wealth. 212
Whether his Progressive social thinking was also motivated by
pity, noblesse oblige or a concern to prevent an escalation of
inequality that would culminate in revolutionary destruction of
the status quo, he regarded it as essential to address the excesses
of capitalism.2 18 This was not to be achieved so much by radically
changing the system as by facilitating regulation and extending

207. See supra Part III.A, F and accompanying text (discussing the
Progressive movement).
208. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
209. This conception has pervaded Court doctrine ever since. The unresolved
tension it entails between the Progressive view that speech must be equalized
and the natural corollary of a free market model-that government must
remain neutral-lies at the heart of the dispute in Citizens United. Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.
210. Bobertz, supra note 63, at 588-89.
211. Bobertz describes Brandeis as recognizing the need to defuse
revolutionary potential by assimilating the dissident factors into the existing
power structure and allowing them to harmlessly ventilate their frustrations
there. Id. at 634. Bringing radical elements into the legitimate process
prevented suppression from forcing them underground where they would
oppose the system from outside and foment revolution against a power
structure from which they were explicitly excluded:
Toward this end, Brandeis encouraged the formation of institutions and
practices, such as trade unions and collective bargaining, that would
tame the disorderly politics of the left by bringing its members into the
political mainstream. As one writer suggested, Brandeis's efforts
throughout his career can be seen as being directed toward the
development of "far-sighted strategies of system maintenance.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
212. Id. at 623-49.
213. Id. at 630-49.
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participation (or at least the perception of participation) to those
marginalized sectors of society.
This meant convincing those circumscribed segments of
American society on the brink of accepting revolutionary recourse
that they did have a say in determining the status quo. 214 By
opening the channels of communication between the radical labor
movements such as the Wobblies and the instruments of
government and through acceptance of their participation in the
process of determining what was fair within the existing
framework, the oppressed-who would otherwise turn to
revolutionary methods to achieve change-accepted the legitimacy
of the system that oppressed them. 215 Of course, this also meant
that they accepted the fundamental structure of the social system
with any inherent inequalities as well. The carrot on the end of the
stick was the prospect of the ability to achieve positive change
within that system. 216
It was apparent from Brandeis's frustration over the Court's
continued willingness to punish people for expressing their views
on matters of national importance in Schaefer v. United StateS217
and Pierce v. United StateS218 that he was approaching his limit. 219
Another source of vexation was at work upon Brandeis as well.
Bobertz relates how Brandeis's frustration with the Court's
repeated willingness to overturn economic regulation enacted in
the name of the social good on the basis that it infringed upon
individual rights led him to endorse a judicial philosophy he did
not share. 220 For pragmatic reasons, Brandeis ratified the judicial
perspective that individual constitutional rights override
legislative determinations concerning the common good. 221 While
214. Id. at 601.
215. Id. at 628-30.
216. Whether the promise of such change within a structure whose design
inherently produced and perpetuated inequality was illusory or not probably
was obscured to most laborers. They were struggling to survive and were
above all immediately concerned with providing for their welfare. They were
thrilled to receive a portion of the pie and the promise of more to come if they
bought into the myth that they would receive equal treatment under the law.
217. Shaefer v. United States, 252 U.S. 466, 482-83 (1920) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
218. Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
219. Jay characterizes Pierce as "the last straw for Justice Brandeis, who
could not accept the imprisonment of people for expressing a partisan opinion
about a matter of the gravest national importance." Jay, supra note 38, at 856,
859.
220. See Bobertz, supra note 63, at 630-49 (devoting an entire section of the
article to Brandeis and his thinking).
221. Id. at 574; GRABER, supra note 2, at 101. Graber points out that
Brandeis in articulating his basis for upholding individual rights claims relied
upon cases upholding individual economic liberties from regulation in which
he delivered "blistering" dissents, effectively relying upon stare decisis in spite
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Brandeis undoubtedly bristled at acknowledging the validity of the
Court's precedent affirming the primacy of individual rights as
trumping important social needs, the silver-lining was that this
also vindicated protection for individuals challenging the powers
that be in order to achieve worthwhile social change. 222
With the Whitney concurrence, Brandeis developed the
functional justifications of Chafee and those expressed by Holmes's
dissent in Abrams and endowed them with constitutional origin.223

The Court bought Brandeis's inspiring reinvention of the pedigree
of First Amendment protection of free speech. 224 The "bad
tendency" test was annihilated by the adoption of a diametrically
different approach that embraced gradual political change
produced by speech as an intended part of the political process and
essential to the Founders' vision: "[t]he maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system."225
Significantly, public attitude had changed 226 about the
importance of protecting the right to express oneself and about the
importance of preserving a realm of personal autonomy apart from
the wet blanket of social suppression represented by the State.
This was expressed not merely in the popular press, but in the
intellectual literature of the day to which Brandeis was a
contributor. 227 The Court unquestionably felt the impact of this
new public support for protecting the individual's personal
freedom from such government strictures. 228 The climate had
of his personal conviction that the Court was acting beyond the pale in
protecting individual freedoms in contravention of legislative expressions of
the common good. Id. at 102.
222. Bobertz, supra note 63, at 630-49.
223. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams, 250
U.S. at 624-30 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
224. Bobertz, supra note 63, at 588-95.
225. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
226. GRABER, supra note 2, at 24-26. See also Bobertz, supra note 63, at 60708 (describing the emergence of a "new understanding of free speech" that
emerged after Abrams that coalesced in the popular conscience as the result of
the illuminations of Progressive periodicals such as the Nation and the New
Republic and the writings of Progressive thinkers).
227. Id.
228. The extent to which the Court leads or follows public attitude change is
a subject beyond the scope of this article. The views of the Legal Realists
notwithstanding, suffice it to say, the Court's susceptibility to the influence of
public opinion is by now well accepted. WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., LAW AND
ATTTUDE CHANGE (1985). See Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns &
Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How Public Opinion Constrains the Supreme Court
(Nov. 5, 2008) (unpublished paper), available at http://government.arts.cornell.
edulassets/faculty/docs/enns/OpinionSC.pdf (on file with Am. J. of Political

2010]

The Transformation of Freedom of Speech

107

changed, and Brandeis provided the intellectual and constitutional
foundation to support a new speech-protective model that was easy
for the Court to accept.
The Court began ruling in favor of free speech claims. 229 With
Fiske v. KansaS230 and the cases that followed, 231 the Court
majority moved toward acceptance of a role that protected speech
as a right that prevailed against governmental interests. 232 In
Herndon v. Lowry,233 the Court applied the "clear and present
danger" test.234 But not in the manner of the "bad tendency"
approach seen in Schenck. 235 The Court now applied it in the
manner expressed by Chafee and by Holmes in his dissent in
Abrams.236 It had become a speech-protective standard.
At this point, the Lochner era ended and the Court in the
Carolene Productsfootnote drew its legendary distinction between
personal rights and economic interests to explain its newfound
protection of speech rights and tolerance of government regulation
of commercial enterprises. 237 The protective version of the "clear
and present danger" test would be the standard applied by the
Court for decades thereafter. With the onset of World War II and
the Espionage Act still on the books, the Court effectively reversed
its "bad tendency" application of the "clear and present danger"
test in its holdings in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs.238 This
Science) (indicating the public opinion maintains a significant direct effect on
the Supreme Court's decision making).
229. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 380 (1927) (ruling in favor of free
speech claims); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 242 (1937) (ruling in favor of
free speech claims).
230. Fiske was not really a speech case. Fiske, 274 U.S. at 380. Fiske, a
Wobblie, was not convicted based on evidence of anything he said, but upon a
message in an IWW leaflet urging abolition of the wage system. Id. at 381-85.
Absent any evidence of advocacy of violence, something the statute required,
the Court had no difficulty finding Fiske had not violated the statute. Id. at
386-87.
231. See, e.g., Stromberg,283 U.S. at 359 (reversing a conviction for violating
a statute that prohibits display of a red flag in opposition to organized
government); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 343 (1937) (holding peaceable
assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime, nor can it be
proscribed). The court composition changed between Whitney and Stromberg.
Five Justices remained from the Whitney majority. Three of them voted with
the Stromberg majority (Stone and two of the Lochner era Four Horsemen,
Van Devanter and Sutherland) and two dissented (the other two Four
Horsemen, Butler and McReynolds). The new Court members (Hughes, C.J.
who wrote the Court's opinion, and Roberts-the switch in time that saved
nine) voted with Holmes and Brandeis.
232. Id.
233. Herndon, 301 U.S. at 242.
234. Id. at 252-56, 261.
235. Id. at 256 n.10.
236. Id. at 252-56, 261.
237. CaroleneProducts, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
238. See Hartzell v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 689 (1944) (reversing
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remained the Court's analytic approach until it adopted an even
more protective standard in Brandenburg v. Ohio. 239
IV. THE NEW LIBERAL IDEOLOGY OF RIGHTS AND THE REGULATION
OF CORPORATE SPEECH
Latent in the new liberal approach to rights was an internal
inconsistency with respect to regulations targeting commercial
activity that involves speech interests. The social interest in
speech as an essential prerequisite for the exercise of popular
sovereignty mandated protection. But the post-Lochner era
acceptance of the regulation of commercial activity for the common
good was consistent with the idea of promoting fairness and
leveling the playing field in all aspects of society. The objective of
equalizing election-related speech seemed no different. The
popular sovereignty rationale integrated uneasily with regulation
of speech for the purpose of ensuring that the electorate was
properly informed and exercised the franchise in a wise manner.
Ideally, such "economic" regulations would prevent powerful
organizations from using financial power to distort the free and
considered decision of the sovereign People. But when commercial
activity implicates speech, the neat dichotomy between private
and public rights erodes. The rationale for protecting speech finds
itself at odds with the objectives of commercial regulations.
A. CampaignRegulation of CorporateSpending
Regulation of corporate and union speech is nothing new, as
the Court in Citizens United observed. 240 It emerged to address
Progressive era concerns with political corruption, as expenditures
on political campaigns increased. Substantial regulation began
with the Teapot Dome Scandal in 1925.241 But it was not until
1947 that independent expenditures by unions and corporations
were restricted. 242 The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
was enacted in 1971 to replace the old Federal Corrupt Practices
Act that had been in place since 1925.243 It required candidates to
disclose contributions and expenditures. 244
Addressing widespread public concern over unsavory election
practices in the 1972 presidential election campaign, Congress
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs).
239. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
240. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900.
241. BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM 25-26 (2001).

242. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900.
243. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431-457 (1972). See generally
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (discussing FECA).
244. See Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431-457 (regulating
contributions and expenditures and requiring disclosure).
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acted to impose limits on "hard money" contributions to support
candidates and restrictions upon expenditures via 1974
amendments to FECA.24 5 The Supreme Court in the bicentennial
ruling in Buckley v. Valeo246 addressed a constitutional challenge
to those regulations. The Court found some regulations
unconstitutional and interpreted others in such a way as to avoid
constitutional infirmity.247 Significantly, for purposes of the
analysis here, the Court drew a distinction between direct and
indirect (independent) expenditures. 248 It recognized that there
was no constitutionally safe means-without impinging upon
(chilling) core speech-of differentiating between expenditures to
finance speech pertaining to concerns related to an election issue
(issue advocacy) and expenditures to fund speech intended to get a
particular measure or candidate elected or defeated. 249 Because
such speech merited the utmost protection, the Court construed
FECA narrowly, applying it only to expenditures for speech
involving express advocacy as to how voters should cast their
ballots. 250 This avoided any potential chilling of protected speech
that might overlap with the speech sought to be regulated.
B. The Lesser Standardof ProtectionAccorded CorporateEntities
The express advocacy requirement, that the Court read into
the statutory scheme in order to avoid constitutional infirmity,
protected the discussion of issues that did not involve campaign

245. See id. § 451 (imposing limits on money contributions to support
candidates and restrictions upon expenditures).
246. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
247. Id. The Court accepted the argument that direct contributionsdonations to campaigns-could be limited. Id. The interest in preserving the
integrity of the political process was sufficient to sustain limitations imposed
on contributions to candidates running for public office. Id. at 52. The Court
struck down limitations so far as they applied to contributions to one's own
campaign or a family member's campaign. Id. at 13, 25, 51-54. But otherwise,
the State interest in addressing the reality and appearance of corruption in
the electoral process warranted reasonable restrictions on direct economic
support. Id. More indirect modes of supporting a campaign's views
(independent contributions) implicated more sensitive first amendment issues.
Id. at 59.
248. Id.
249. The Court interpreted the campaign reform statutes as applying only to
speech employing express advocacy to avoid constitutional infirmity. Id. at 7682. The Court's reason for doing so was to prevent the chilling effect
application of the campaign regulations would have upon protected speech
concerning related public issues: "[The distinction between discussion of
issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may
often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are
intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and
governmental actions." Id. at 42.
250. Id. at 26.
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advocacy. 251 This was an imperfect compromise between an
important legislative interest in maintaining the integrity of the
election process and the constitutional requirement fostering free
discussion of election issues. For many years after Buckley there
was confusion about what express advocacy included. 252 Courts
sought to discern whether the term could constitutionally
encompass expenditures that did not involve direct exhortation on
how a voter should cast a ballot. Whether express advocacy was
limited to just such "magic words" or could also constitutionally
include speech that amounted to their "functional equivalent" was
the subject of regulatory and judicial uncertainty. 253
After Buckley, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce254
was decided, recognizing that corporate entities may properly
merit regulation not accorded individuals. 255 The Court found a
compelling State interest in addressing "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's
political ideas." 256
With the mindset of the misbegotten child of Progressivism
251. Id. at 47.
252. Judicial frustration in addressing expenditures plainly designed to
influence election decisions, but that did not bluntly exhort voters to "vote for"
or "vote against," was apparent from tracking the cases in which speech that
was unmistakably campaigning was nevertheless held not subject to the
campaign regulations. See, e.g., FEC v. Central Long Island Tax Reform
Immediately Commerce, 616 F.2d 45, 45 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving a leaflet
which expressed the views of a tax reform group and attacked the voting
record of a local congressman running for election, whose picture was
included); Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468, 468 (1st Cir. 1991) (dealing with a
pro-life voter guide); FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Com., 839 F.
Supp. 1448, 1448 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd, 533 U.S. 413 (2001) (dealing with
mailings attacking congressional members for opposition to abortion rights
and the Equal Rights Amendment); FEC v. American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, 471 F. Supp. 315, 315 (D.D.C. 1979)
(distributing a poster to union members criticizing President Ford for
pardoning former President Nixon); FEC v. Christian Action Network, 894 F.
Supp. 946, 946 (W.D.Va. 1995) (noting a television ad which criticized
presidential candidate Bill Clinton for allegedly supporting radical
homosexual causes).
253. See FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987) (listing such
magic words as: "elect," "support," etc.); Governor Gray Davis Comm. v.
American Taxpayers Alliance, 102 Cal. App. 4th, 449, 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(adopting "a more comprehensive approach" to the definition of "express
advocacy" under FECA, rather than focusing exclusively on "magic words");
California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1097-98 (9th Cir.
2003) (citing to Furgatchand following the "magic word" approach).
254. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-660

(1990).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 660.
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guiding them, legislatures, regulatory agencies, and courts did not
perceive any need to apply the same standard applied in Buckley
to speech by corporate entities. 257 These were fictitious, economic
entities, so they seemed the proper subject of regulation. The
BCRA of 2002258 imposed restrictions upon corporate-funded
political advertising in certain time periods leading up to a federal
election. 259 BCRA amended the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA) of 1971 to prohibit corporations from funding
electioneering communications with general treasury funds. 260
Section 203 of BCRA expanded the range of corporate speech
subject to regulation. 26 1 Consequently, this sequence of legal
events brought a great deal more corporate speech under
regulatory scrutiny.
Shortly after enactment of BCRA, section 203 was challenged,
and in 2003 the Supreme Court addressed the amendments to
FECA in McConnell v. FEC.262 The Court bluntly acknowledged
the embarrassing reality of the situation in McConnell.263 Limiting
the import of FECA to express advocacy really accomplished
nothing.
The Court held that application of a standard that
encompassed more than the "magic words" of express advocacy
survived a constitutional challenge for facial validity even though
it included "issue advocacy." 264 It held that the speech regulated by
the statute was the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy. 265
The Court concluded there was no overbreadth concern with
respect to speech that was the "functional equivalent" of express
advocacy. 266 The justifications for regulating independent
corporate expenditures constituting express advocacy "apply
equally" to ads that are "the functional equivalent of express
advocacy."267 The regulation of such expenditures was warranted
because they could have the kind of "corrosive and distorting
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 658-669.
2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2).
Id.
See id. (amending FECA).
Id.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003).
The Court stated: "the presence or absence of magic words cannot

meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech ..

..

[B]uckley's magic-words

requirement is functionally meaningless .... [N]ot only can advertisers easily
evade the line by eschewing the use of magic words, but they would seldom
choose to use such words even if permitted." Id. at 193-194. The Court in
Citizens United underscored this inadequacy: "[plolitical speech is so ingrained
in our culture that speakers find ways to circumvent campaign finance laws."
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912.
264. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190-217.
265. Id. at 204-06.
266. Id. at 204-06.
267. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
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effect" on the electorate recognized in Austin and because the
government had a compelling interest in countering those
effects. 268 In other words, corporate entities, and unions, were
entitled to a lesser standard of protection under the First
Amendment than private actors.
C. The Latent Tension Surfaces
Now the government was regulating a much more indefinite
and broader range of corporate speech. The effect this had was to
shift judicial focus from the question of whether the regulation
could encompass more than "magic words" to the broader issue of
whether the regulations could treat some speech differently than
other speech based upon economic considerations. This served to
bring the problem with regulation of economic activity that
overlapped into First Amendment expressive conduct squarely
onto the judicial radar. We have now traced how the problem
created by this conflicted treatment of government regulation of
corporate election speech came into focus as a legal issue.
In this light, we can understand how the conflict surfaced in
Citizens United.269 Both the majority and the dissent in Citizens
United relied upon the same functional approach articulated in the
Abrams dissent and Whitney concurrence. 270 The majority
opinion's analysis is infused with references to the marketplace of
ideas. 271 The dissent is pure Progressive thinking, emphasizing
corruption, inequality, a non-individualistic conception of freedom
and the imperative of the social good. 272 The majority makes some
268. Id. at 205.
269. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.
270. Id.; Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney, 274 U.S.
at 372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
271. "Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the
'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the
First Amendment seeks to foster." Citizens United, 120 S. Ct. at 900. "Austin
interferes with the 'open marketplace' of ideas protected by the First
Amendment." Id. at 884. "And 'the electorate [has been] deprived of
information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function."' Id. at 907 (quoting
United States v. Cong. of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106, 144 (1948)).
272. "[L]egislatures are entitled to decide 'that the special characteristics of
the corporate structure require careful regulation' in an electoral context." Id.
at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The Framers thus took it as a given that
corporations could be comprehensively regulated in the service of the public
welfare." Id. at 949-50. "[C]orporations have 'special advantages-such as
limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation
and distribution of assets,' that allow them to spend prodigious treasury sums
on campaign messages that have 'little or no correlation' with the beliefs held
by actual persons." Id. at 956 (citations omitted).
The legal structure of corporations allows them to amass and deploy
financial resources on a scale few natural persons can match. The
structure of a business corporation, furthermore, draws a line between
the corporation's economic interests and the political preferences of the
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effort to dispel the substantive concern of unfairness created by
economic disparities. 273 But a valid concern remains that in a
social structure embodying disparities in power certain views do
not get heard or are drowned out. 274
On the other hand, the majority's objection to a process
involving government efforts to equalize the effect of wealth upon
the expression of political viewS 275 is logically unassailable. As we
shall see, the models evincing concern with equalizing the
marketplace of ideas do not mesh with the metaphor for free
speech evolved in judicial doctrines that emphasizes the social
value of speech. 276
These models provide no toehold for justifying treating some
private speakers or speech differently. Their rationales for
protecting speech do not differentiate based on source. To the
contrary, they explicitly assume that speech-whatever its
source-is intrinsically valuable whether for sorting out the
"truth" or for the function of the democratic process, or to guard
against government malfeasance. They all accept the ultimate
objective of speech to be facilitating the exercise of popular
sovereignty. But government "by the People" presumes that
government remains a creature that is the expression of the
unaffected will of the People and takes no part in its own
creation. 277 State agent evaluations, as to what speech is or is not
significant to the decision being made in an election, involve
government in a decisional role reserved to the People. Because
such government intrusion into the process of self-governance is
antithetical to the ultimate aim of popular sovereignty, the State's
individuals associated with the corporation; the corporation must
engage the political process with the aim "to enhance the profitability of
the company, no matter how persuasive the arguments for a broader or
conflicting set of priorities[.]" Consequently, when corporations grab up
the prime broadcasting slots on the eve of an election, they can flood the
market with advocacy that bears "little or no correlation" to the ideas of
natural persons or to any broader notion of the public good.
Id. at 974 (citations omitted). Those aggregations can distort the "free trade in
ideas" crucial to candidate elections. Id.
273. Citizens United, 120 S. Ct. at 886-917.
274. See discussion supra pp. 90-91, 96-97 and infra note 289 and
accompanying text (examining Holmes and Mills).
275. "[B]uckley rejected the premise that the Government has an interest 'in
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the
outcome of elections."' Citizens United, 120 S. Ct. at 904.
276. See supra notes 1-146 and accompanying text (introducing and
discussing free speech concerns). Court observers had noted the Court's
increased willingness to look askance at discretion manifested in regulatory
efforts acting upon the free play of the marketplace of ideas to produce an
anti-competitive effect. Persily, supra note 9, at 110.
277. The majority expressed this concept: '"The civic discourse belongs to
the people, and the Government may not prescribe the means used to conduct
it."' Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 917.
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role as a regulator of speakers or content is devoid of theoretical
support.
V.

EVALUATING THE COMPATIBILITY OF AN EQUALIZATION
APPROACH WITH RATIONALES FOR FREE SPEECH

To recap, the conception of freedom of speech extant at the
founding of the republic and for over a century thereafter was
characterized by the common law conception that while prior
restraint was precluded, criminal and civil liability attached to
libelous, seditious, and other improper speech, and by the
prerogative of federalism-omitting states from the First
Amendment's reach. In contrast, a more expansive conception of
speech rights rose to the fore after the Civil War. An ideological
construct supporting judicial protection of speech had clearly
emerged well before the mid-twentieth century. This basis for
protecting free speech was functionally linked to fundamental
precepts of the American constitutional system of governance. The
basic variations on the rationale that have emerged and have come
to be recognized as underlying the right can be isolated. 278 Each
can then be assessed in terms of its amenability to government
curtailment for the purpose of achieving some greater social good.
A. Natural Law/Absolutist Approach to ProtectingFree Speech
First, and unrelated to the modern rationale for protecting
speech, is a justification based upon inchoate moral principlesthe natural law conception of man as a free agent in the state of
nature who is able to restrict his freedom rationally and
voluntarily by contractual agreement. 279 This view, associated
with Jefferson and other Founders and derived from classical
liberal thought, regards the Constitution as the contractual
delegation of power and relinquishment of specified rights for the
purpose of obtaining the benefits associated with representative
government. 280 If the rights are not specifically relinquished, the

278. The author acknowledges his reliance upon the work of Professor Powe
in the identification and explication of the variants of the basic functional free
speech models. See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND
THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA (1991) (identifying
and explaining the basic functional free speech models).
279. Hence the conflict between Federalists and Anti-Federalists over
whether the Bill of Rights was superfluous. Jefferson held that "no power over
the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press being
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, all lawful powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were
reserved to the States, or to the people." THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE KENTUCKY
RESOLUTIONS OF 1798-99 (1798), availableat http://wwwl.assumption.eduluse
rs/mcclymer/Hisl30/PHIPartisan%2OPress/FirstKentuckyResolution.html.

280. Id.

2010]

The Transformationof Freedom of Speech

115

individual retains them. 281 Moreover, the fact that the First
Amendment specifically enshrines certain unrelinquished rights is
all the more reason not to abridge them.
Unlike other approaches, this view of the importance of free
speech is not instrumental. It does not depend upon any
significance the expression of opinions may have for society or the
process of self-governance. The right exists as an inherent
attribute of personal liberty and is unassailable in terms of
broader social needs and the private interests of others. 282 It
derives from the principle of individual autonomy that the Court
has, on occasion, intimated merits protection from First
Amendment considerations. 283
This absolutist approach is the least compatible with an

281. Id.

282. The "absolutists" such as William Douglas and Hugo Black were
prepared to concede limits to speech, but not to the individual conscience.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965). For example, one's right to
speak was limited by a neighbor's right to peace and quiet. Health and safety
considerations override one's right to say anything one likes, as neatly
captured by Holmes's aphorism concerning shouting fire in a crowded theater.
The national defense has been regarded as proper justification for penalizing
(and even restraining) the disclosure of matters imperiling that effort. Public
concerns have resulted in judicial acceptance of neutral "time, place and
manner" limitations on speakers. Restrictions on child pornography have been
justified in the name of protecting a class of persons incapable of protecting
themselves. The same argument was pressed by feminists seeking to suppress
pornography as subjugating women. See FINAN, supra note 64, at 242-46.
(discussing this particular argument in depth). This raises the greater
question of at what point government intrusion in the name of the social good
is proper under even the "absolutist" approach. Does it stop at the point of
protecting comparable private rights of others to be free from physical harm or
does it comprehend less tangible moral harm as well? Examination of that
problem, while certainly worthwhile, is not especially germane to
comprehending the sources of the conflict in Citizens United. Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 876.
283. See, e.g., Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l. v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537, 544-545 (1987) (ruling on a statute requiring an organization to
open its doors to women and acknowledging that "the freedom to enter into
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental
element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights" but that "the relationship
among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate or private
relationship that warrants constitutional protection"); Barnette, 319 U.S. at
624 (intimating protections of the First Amendment); Doe, 410 U.S. at 210-221
(Douglas, J., concurring) (overturning a Georgia abortion statute; Douglas, in
his concurrence, notes that rights such as "the autonomous control over the
development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and
personality" are "rights protected by the First Amendment and ... they are
absolute, permitting of no exceptions."). Elsewhere, I have addressed at length
the Court's protection (or lack thereof) of First Amendment-based privacy
rights. See generally Steven J. Andr6, Privacy as an Aspect of the First
Amendment: The Place of Privacy in A Society Dedicated to Individual Liberty,
20 UWLA L. REV. 87 (1989) (discussing First Amendment privacy rights).
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analysis permitting government regulation designed to promote
the greater social good over individual considerations. Derived
from a contractual analysis, the parameters of where society may
impinge upon individual rights are not flexible in accommodating
fluctuating perceptions of what constitutes the social good. In spite
of an upstanding philosophical and historical heritage, the
approach met with negative judicial response prior to World War I
and a minimal reception since Chafee's marketplace of ideas
approach was accepted as a basis for free speech doctrine. 284
The analysis, to the extent that it precludes government
impositions upon the individual's right to say his piece as a matter
of innate right, lends no support to the argument that private
speech should be regulated for the objective of accomplishing a
fairer system of democratic governance. 285 Because the right has
no necessary correlation to self-governance, such considerations
are immaterial. The fact that enormous private agglomerations of
wealth may propel private speech to heights unattainable by other
speakers is merely a matter of private concern. People can say
what they want and spend whatever they want to say it, so long as
they are not hurting anyone else. 286 And the fact that persons
284. WAYNE OVERBECK, MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAw 57 (2007 ed.).
Implicit, if not explicit, in judicial analysis of the question is the notion that
certain impositions upon individual interests are "necessary and proper" as
part of the constitutional contract. Government is implicitly empowered by the
citizenry to carry out certain functions in the common interest as it sees fit
and it is understood that some rights have been ceded to allow this. Thus,
balancing individual interests against social goals set by the Legislature was a
weighing process that did not bode well for the expression of speech that
opposed government agendas. In essence, the assertion that the individual is
more important than everyone else is tough for courts to swallow.
285. In view of the essential idea of popular sovereignty, placing a
government agent in a capacity of deciding what speech is more meritorious
than other speech places them in a role from which government agents are
excluded by fundamental constitutional design. This intervention, in the guise
of assisting the process of self-governance, actually interferes with the ability
of the People to make decisions freely and unadulterated by the meddling of
State agents. The casting of government administrators as shepherds or
stewards of the public good is totalitarian and contrary to the individualistic
precepts accepted by the Founders.
286. The hard lesson learned from efforts to limit the depth and breadth of
public discourse is apparent from our long national experience with
organizations seeking to regulate the range of public discourse on issues
involving moral, artistic, political and social issues. Tocqueville identified our
nation's propensity for suppression over 150 years ago. From the efforts of
private organizations such as the Moral Majority to those of public
organizations such as the House Un-American Activities Commission (HUAC),
the attempt to impose the moral agenda of a majority, or at least those
wielding power, upon others in the name of the public good has only led to the
abuse of individuals and the inevitable suppression of socially valuable speech.
The moral evaluation that certain organizations merit regulation to promote a
particular conception of fairness in the election process is no different. Such
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might unite to pool resources in one associational form or another
to do the same thing is likewise a matter of private concern. If
people want to hang out together and convey a certain message
that makes them happy, then that is their business. 287
B. The Functional "FreeMarketplace"Approach

Second, the modern liberal approach illuminated by Chafee
and given life in court doctrine by Holmes in his Abrams dissent
and by Brandeis in his Whitney concurrence finds the reason for
protecting speech flows from the systemic value of free speech. 288
This functional justification for free speech perceives its value as
one of providing a pathway to truth. Because no one is so naive as
to suggest that truth will invariably triumph as a result of this
process, 289 a necessary corollary is that the process of searching for
the truth is one of trial and error in a competitive process. Truth is
a commodity the public shops for in an idealized free marketplace
of ideas. The protection of individual rights functions to promote
this process.
The fairness of this process is challenged as affecting the
ability of some to effectively market their ideas and of some to
receive them. The process is impaired as a result of the unequal
distribution of resources in society. The conception of freedom is
not one of "free" in the sense of a lack of regulation by government.
It is "free" in the sense of the right to speak being meaningful. It
asks: "[w]hat good is the right if I cannot be heard by anyone? Why
regulation entails no logical exception compatible with the libertarian
theoretical approach. Apart from theory, practice would inevitably reveal the
non-neutral imposition of one moral valuation concerning the propriety of
certain speech upon one group of speakers, but not others.
287. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 958 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
Founding Fathers were not (as the Citizens United dissent correctly
recognizes) unconcerned about the problem of faction as manifested in the rise
of political parties and corporations distorting the process. Id. However, the
classical basis for free speech does not support compensatory checks and
balances to account for such distortion. Id. To the contrary, it supports the
opposite conclusion; that pluralism should remain unregulated.
288. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney, 274 U.S. at
372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
289. Certainly Mill did not believe this would occur. John Stuart Mill, On
Liberty, in THE BASIc WRITING OF JOHN STUART MILL 29-30 (2002). He readily
acknowledged that majoritarian fervor, emotion and other factors interfere
with the power of reason to arrive at proper utilitarian principles: "[b]ut,
indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution is one of those
pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into
commonplaces, but which all experience refutes . . . . [I]t is a piece of idle
sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to
error of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake." Id. What "truth"
represents for the Progressive view advanced by Chafee, therefore, is not some
illusory metaphysical ideal, but the social good as conceived by the majority of
the public. Id.
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should I waste my breath standing and shouting from a soapbox
while a countervailing view is blasted from all the major television
networks?" Without intervention, some voices conveying important
information may be drowned out. Other voices containing
hyperbole and misinformation may be accepted by the electorate
when they ought not. So (the argument goes), the impediments
and advantages should be addressed to prevent the search for
truth from being distracted or obscured by such obstacles. But the
individualistic marketplace model does not comport with such
egalitarian objectives.
The problem is not with the premise that the marketplace is
unfair, it is with the solution. The very idea of placing government
bureaucrats in the role of deciding what the electorate should and
should not consider in determining the truth or public interest is
problematic in terms of the rationale that speech allows voters to
discern the truth. Political truth is a transitory and amorphous
concept. Public bureaucrats and legislators have no special access
to enlightenment. They have no proper role-in terms of this
model-in "helping" the People arrive at the "correct" decision.
Regulation essentially places the bureaucrat in the role of deciding
what is in the public interest, a role that would seem to obscure
and detract from the popular effort to divine truth every bit as
much as the inequities in society sought to be addressed by such
regulatory action in the first instance. While, its objective is to
provide a more even airing of options to facilitate the exercise of
sounder judgment by the People, in implementation, regulation
serves to prevent this and may effectively allow the fox to guard
the henhouse.
Regulation of the "marketplace of ideas" effectively places a
government agent in the role of a censor. This unavoidably injects
the personal perspective/bias of one person or one agency into the
function of the marketplace of ideas-determining the information
the People are to have access to and will be allowed to review
regarding what the public good should be. This inevitably affects,
distorts, and skews that process. Endowing a government
functionary with discretion to decide what speech needs to be
toned up or down places that official in the inherently non-neutral
position of deciding what speaker or viewpoint merits what level of
the public's attention. 290 Personal pre-determinations regarding
290. In view of the essential premise of popular sovereignty, placing
government agents in a capacity of deciding what speech is more meritorious
than other speech places them in a role from which they are excluded by
fundamental constitutional design. This intervention, in the guise of assisting
the process of self-governance, actually interferes with the ability of the People
to make decisions freely and unadulterated by the meddling of State agents.
The casting of government administrators as shepherds or stewards of the
public good is totalitarian and contrary to the individualistic precepts accepted
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what political vision is the "truth" will-either subtly or even
blatantly-intrude into their decisions. It does not take a Legal
Realist to recognize that regulators will bring with them personal
biases that will influence such decisions. 291
Placing government in the role of modulator-turning down
some speech, turning up the decibel level of other speech-is
representative of the fatal flaw with Progressive thinking, which is
recognizing problems but failing to think through the details and
ramifications of the solutions. 292 Progressive trust in the expertise
of government agencies as inherently capable of ascertaining the
public good was betrayed. Progressive willingness to cede the
determination of the public good to legislative or administrative
agencies when put into practice was found to result in abuse,
intrusion on individual rights, corruption, and all the same perils
to the social good that Progressives feared and sought to combat in
the first place. 293 The same difficulty holds true with government
regulation of speech. The role is subject to abuse, whether
intentionally by corrupt government agents or unintentionally by
well-meaning public servants. Even if there is no abuse by
government officials, the appearance of abuse engendered by a
process in which government may second-guess the citizenry
threatens the system's legitimacy.
Regulation is contrary to the marketplace paradigm that
relies upon the ability of an idea to be accepted in an open
marketplace by a free and rational citizenry based upon its worth
rather than other factors such as fancy packaging and marketing
or the fact that most people endorse it or that it is government
approved. The Court has adhered to the view that money, like a
speaker's soapbox, enables speech such that money is bound up as

by the Founders.
291. Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion,
Inequality and Participation,101 MICH. L. REV. 2409 (2003). Professor Tokaji
elaborated upon the need for the judiciary to reign in governmental discretion
as inevitably producing distortion in the marketplace of ideas, coining the
term "First Amendment Equal Protection" for a doctrine curtailing
government departures from neutrality. Id. at 2410-12. Outside of the election
context, however, the Supreme Court has not been receptive to the notion that
governmental speakers, in contrast to regulators of speech, are subject to
constraints upon their discretionary determination to favorably air certain
views over others. Id. at 2457-60; Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129
S. Ct. 1125, 1125, 1127 (2009). Professor Tokaji's concern over the hazard
presented by the application of discretion by government officials relating to
undermining the free nature of public discourse remains entirely valid and
acutely appropriate with respect to the election setting. Tokaji, supra, at 241012.
292. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (mentioning the
Progressives' main themes).
293. See supra p. 90 and p. 96 (discussing the Progressive movement).
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an essential and protected component of the right. 294 The fact that
some speakers can afford bigger soapboxes is simply not a concern
of government. In keeping with the marketplace analogy, the
Court has declined to regard spending money for speech as subject
to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. 295

C. The Functional "Educational"Approach
A third approach, also conceiving of free speech as an
essential prerequisite to democratic governance, emphasizes the
importance of an informed, involved public evaluating the issues
upon which it is called to govern in a process of robust debate. This
approach, pressed by Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, stresses
that the freedom to express one's views is essential to the
government's
the
He
advocated
process. 296
democratic
for
persons to
in
each
locale
hall
meetings
of
town
establishment
297
no
He
perceived
issues.
political
and
discuss
learn about
and
to
enlarge
State
acting
upon
the
limitation
constitutional
enrich "[t]he freedom of mind which befits the members of a selfgoverning society ... ." 298
Adopting the mode of a New England town meeting, Meiklejohn
looked to structured debate with Robert's Rules of Order prevailing.
He focused not on "the words of the speakers, but the minds of the
hearers." Thus, "what is essential is not that everyone shall speak,
but that everything worth saying shall be said." With the focus on
the listeners rather than the speakers, the state may play a
moderating role to ensure that ideas to decision making are brought
forward and redundancies limited. 299
Other First Amendment pontificators pushed this rationale to
its logical conclusion: that the listener's interest in having a fair
presentation of the information on a particular subject requires
government intervention to ensure that this occurs.30 0

294. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65-66 (accepting the use of money to facilitate
speech as essentially a form of speech itself). The Buckley Court found that the
right to join together "for the advancement of beliefs and ideas," is diluted if it
does not include the right to pool money through contributions, for funds are
often essential if "advocacy" is to be truly or optimally "effective." Id. All
citizens are equally allowed to use their private property to enable their
speech. This ends the inquiry. The question of how the strength of one's
convictions compares to the size of one's pocketbook does not get considered.
295. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 159 (1939).
296. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITIcAL FREEDOM 19-20 (1960).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 26; POwE supra note 278, at 247.
300. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment
Right, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1641, 1642-78 (1967) (stating the following
assumption: "[fiull and free discussion has indeed been the first of our faith"
and noting "[t]he assumption apparent in this excerpt is that, without
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With modern consolidation of media sources, the Progressive
nightmare of corporate abuse of the right to free speech to exclude
socially valuable ideas and distort the process to favor special
interests over the public good is exacerbated. A self-governing
society that is left in the dark concerning certain significant facts
cannot make wise decisions.3 0 The idea that an "invisible hand"
operates to motivate the press and interested players to locate and
disseminate information into the marketplace of ideas has some
merit with respect to information that serves certain political
agendas or makes newsworthy material. But the complaint that
the mainstream media gives short shrift to significant information
of which the public should be aware is worrisome. 302 Resonating
such concerns, the perspective advocated by Owen Fiss and Judith
Lichtenberg303 is that where the press and other free market
sources fail to fulfill the function of keeping the public adequately
informed, government should step in and compensate or regulate
to see that this occurs.304 The problems with this notion, as already
detailed, are manifold, 05 and the Court has not been receptive. 0 6
government intervention, there is a free market mechanism for ideas."). See
also Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 367 (1969) (adopting the
approach to vindicate government regulation of the limited venue of public
television).
301. A corollary of the foregoing approach has produced legislation
mandating open government or "sunshine" laws and acknowledged the
importance of allowing public access to information in keeping with this train
of thought. But this means of providing the public with access to information
is not self-actualizing. It is still dependent upon motivated individuals who
request government agents to provide specific information. The problem with
government deciding what public information to impart and what not to
impart presents the same danger posed by government regulation of private
speech. The Court's adoption of a standard that government regulation of
private speech must be content neutral suggests, as its logical analog, that
government determinations regarding what information to share with the
public pertaining to election issues must likewise be neutral.
302. See CENSORED 2010: THE TOP 25 CENSORED STORIES OF 2008-09 8-12

(Peter Phillips, Mickey Huff, & Project Censored eds., 2009) (listing twentyfive news stories that didn't make the news and more accounts of media
inadequacy in fulfilling the function of enlightening the public), and the
previous publications in this series of books.
303. POWE, supra note 278, at 250-55; Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1415 (1986); Judith Lichtenberg,
Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 329,
333 (1987).
304. See id. (hinting that like the Progressives, who through bitter
experience came (like the Founding Fathers) to distrust governmental
involvement in the process of self-government, these thinkers had not yet
become jaded).
305. Government agents have their own motivations for distorting the
process. The question of who should decide what information or voices to
include or modulate in the public discourse is really no different than the
concerns germane to censorship generally. As one scholar observed:
"[ilnevitably this requires a value judgment on the part of judges as to which
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Ultimately, this public "need to know" model involving
administrative intervention to equalize the flow of information
suffers from all the same frailties identified with respect to the
search for "truth" rationale and butts up against other
insurmountable constitutional principles. The Progressive concern
over distortion of the marketplace of ideas from the influence
obtained by private consolidations of wealth is equally valid with
respect to government activity impacting the marketplace of ideas.
But government, unlike private players, enjoys no constitutional
right to speak, is not immune from regulation, and is likely
required to refrain from seeking to influence the electorate based
upon fundamental constitutional principles.30 7
The principle of government neutrality that is inextricably
bound up with the linkage of the marketplace ideology of free
speech to self-governance that coaleced after Abrams contemplates
that the People, not a governing elite, are charged with the
responsibility of determining their destiny.3 08 Interference with
that role by agents of government, the servants of the sovereign
People, conflicts with the effective performance of that
responsibility. In practice too, the government regulation of the
marketplace of ideas breaks down.309 And, if not in actual practice,
at least in appearance, such that the legitimacy of the process is
undermined. The reason for this stems from the fact that
regulation unavoidably involves introduction of a value judgment.
The government auditor charged with modulating the forum is
necessarily placed in the role of deciding who should speak and
what speech deserves consideration and/or to what degree that
speech should be considered by the listening public.

interests are legitimate and how much weight they should be given." Jay,
supra note 38, at 781. The issue concerning the cause of global warming, like
the idea that the earth is not flat or that the sun does not revolve around the
earth, presents value judgments relating to what information may or may not
be worthy of consideration. When the question is before the electorate, this
governmental role presents too great an opportunity to discount novel ideas
and dismiss them as inconsequential and not worthy of inclusion in the
discussion or to favor or disfavor certain ideas over others based upon personal
predispositions of the evaluator. The process is inherently non-neutral.
306. 'The concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements
of our society in order to enhance the relative voices of others, is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
307. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (citing and discussing Citizens
United).
308. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616.
309. The failure is one of trust: "The state lacks 'moderators' who can be
trusted to know when 'everything worth saying' has been said." Kenneth
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20, 40 (1975).
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D. The Functional"Watchdog"Approach
Another approach conceives of the rationale for protecting
free speech and a free press in terms of its watchdog value. Its
value is conceived as essential to popular governance by holding
government agents accountable, checking government misconduct
and excess. "The checking theory, unlike both the marketplace and
self-government theories, is bottomed in neither truth nor
rationality, but rather in distrust. It assumes a darker side to
human nature and holds that those who wield governmental
power will be prone to overreaching, and thus that it is essential to
provide information for a resisting citizenry."3 10 The ability of
individuals to disseminate information concerning perceived
government malfeasance serves to alert the People to cast their
votes accordingly and to keep government agents from departing
from their duty to serve the public interest. This rationale does not
lend itself to a differential treatment of speech. To the extent that
it is primarily based upon skepticism about government motives, it
provides no logical basis to entrust government agents with the
discretion involved in regulating public debate.
E. The Absence of Support for a Government "Equalization"Role
with Respect to Private Speech
Neither the individualistic approach to free speech consistent
with the Founders' conception of rights nor the functional
rationales that emerged as a product of Progressive efforts to
reform society are compatible with government regulation seeking
to accomplish some sort of parity in the effectiveness of speech.
This incongruity between the dominant marketplace of ideas
paradigm311 and legislative and judicial inclinations to regulate
speech in the name of egalitarian considerations has now surfaced
with the Court's ruling in Citizens United.312 Regulations based
upon perceived inequalities in society will need to await the
adoption of a new rationale for free speech that is amenable to
government censorship in the name of the greater common good.
310. POWE, supra note 278, at 238.
311. See Jonathon Schonsheck, The "Marketplaceof Ideas:" A Siren Song for
Freedom of Speech Theorists, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN A DIVERSE
WORLD 27-38 (Deirdre Golash ed., 2010) (observing the entrenchment of the
marketplace of ideas paradigm in judicial analysis and lamenting its
consequences in terms of skewing analysis due to a faulty analogy); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 4 (1995) (pointing
to the ubiquity of the marketplace metaphor in free speech analysis); W. Wat
Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 J. & MASS
COMM. Q. 40, 40 (1996) (carefully dissecting the entrenchment of the
marketplace of ideas metaphor in the Supreme Court's discussions and
cataloguing the scholarly discontent with and criticism of the analogy as
"inherently flawed" and the use of it as "naive, unthinking, or both").
312. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.
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This would necessarily entail a substantial departure from what
have come to be perceived as fundamental tenets of constitutional
governance and the dogma surrounding the role of free speech in
that scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The flaw inherent in balancing tests is that the scales of
justice are susceptible to being "tipped." The "thumb on the scale"
is manifested in terms of what a court portrays as tossed on each
scale. As Professor Shapiro enjoyed pointing out,3 13 how you
characterize what is at stake makes all the difference. If what is
being weighed is merely a silly leaflet to which no one is going to
pay much attention, the interest in suppression is not accorded
much weight. Conversely, if what lies in the balance is the fate of
our entire democratic way of life314 being undermined by a
corrosive doctrine, that whale on the scale pretty well offsets any
functional interest in protecting single individuals' speech rights.
The "clear and present danger" test suffered the infirmities of
scale-tipping until the Supreme Court began placing something
new on the "individual" side of the scale. 315
The Lockean, natural rights-based approach to the protection
of speech was largely unsuccessful in capturing public or judicial
adherents.316 In a simple utilitarian calculus, weighing the
miniscule individual's right to make a fuss and complain against
the hefty popular interest in making the annoying loudmouth shut
up, the social interest as represented by the State was bound to
313. Professor Martin Shapiro, United States Constitutional Law, lecture at
University of California Berkley (Fall 1982). The marketplace of ideas
paradigm, to the extent that it continues to value free speech for its socially
beneficial attributes, still leaves the Court poised to weigh such interests
unfavorably against other imperative social interests. This is more apparent
outside the context of core, political speech. This is because speech that has
little to do with the political process has less capital in terms of the
marketplace's ultimate purpose-self-governance. The utilitarian calculus of
weighing the good of all of society against the interests of one individual
remains (as it did with the "bad tendency" and "clear and present danger"
tests) an invitation for judicial officers to inject their own valuations of the
relative weight to be accorded each side of the scale. This is often tipped by the
assessment of what is supposedly sitting on each side of the scale. Placing
socially valueless smut on one side and the wholesome concern with protecting
society's children on the other is going to tip the scales one way. Plopping the
bulky societal interest in protecting freedom of expression and the
dissemination of novel ideas on one side versus the attenuated concern with
potential harm that hypothetically could befall individual children on the
other would produce a different result.
314. What Professor Shapiro referred to as "the parade of horribles."
315. See supra notes 229-38 and accompanying text (citing to Lowry, 301
U.S. at 242 and Hartzell, 322 U.S. at 680).
316. See supra notes 114-31 and accompanying text (citing to Weinreib
forthcoming, supra note 111, FINAN supra note 64, and a number of cases).
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prevail. 3 17 When acceptance of an individual rights-based analysis
began to gain some traction in the courts it came in a form
abhorrent to most liberal supporters of speech as an instrument of
social reform. 318 This analysis tipped the scales against legislative
objectives because it regarded the entire purpose of government as
being the protection of the individual. 319
The courts utilized this rights-based methodology to protect
the industrialists, the trusts, the wealthy, and the powerful-the
very forces perceived as working counter to the greater social good.
Rather than weighing selfish, private interests against altruistic
social objectives, the courts were acknowledging that private
rights trumped the Legislature's determination of what was in the
public interest. 320 This did not comport with basic Progressive
thinking that regarded broad social interests identified by skilled
individual
concerns. 321
as
outweighing
servants
public
Consequently, an individual rights-based analysis was viewed
negatively by Progressive thinkers and legal strategists. When
another functional rights-based approach was embraced by the
Court, a classical liberal rights-based approach would never gain
much ground in judicial doctrine. 322
The new functional approach placed into balance the social
value of speech and weighed it against State interests. Free speech
was no longer merely a private interest. Progressive judicial
tacticians would reconceive speech as an intrinsic social good. Not
just any old social good on a par with every mundane
governmental evaluation of what would be in the public interest,
but a paramount social good. Indeed, it was redefined as the
fundamental component of American democracy-an absolute
essential of our system of government and way of life. 323 Unlike
the private rights concepts that had caused them so much
consternation in terms of extending judicial protection to
exploitative commercial activity, speech could now pose a hefty
counterweight to State interests. Only the most compelling social
good could offset the superior value speech now represented. Best
of all, this approach left Progressives free to press for regulation of

317. See OVERBECK, supra note 284.
318. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (emphasizing the
setbacks that the Progressive movement experienced in the 1890s).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (stating that "the
Progressives looked to legislative and administrative branches of government
to advance their objectives, including protecting speech rights.").
322. See supra Part III.F-G (noting initially the courts receptiveness to the
IWW's efforts prior to WWI and the courts subsequent response to the
progressive doctrine).
323. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Brandeis).
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private activity-to curb the excesses of commercial enterprise
that were counter to the social good and carried no significant
324
weight meriting judicial protection.
But in the new functional conception, Progressive priorities
with pursuing the broad social good emphasized regulating public
discourse to ensure that voices that would otherwise be
marginalized would be heard. For many decades the courts would
accept the restriction of the speech of artificial entitiescorporations-as a proper regulatory measure. 325 But the problem
with regulation of campaign activity is that it places government
in the role of deciding who can speak about what and how much
they can say. For the absolutists, this runs squarely up against the
First Amendment requirement that government shall make no
laws restricting free speech. 326 The marketplace of ideas rationale
for protecting free speech, although arising from functional
considerations, is likewise counter to the limitations imposed upon
the State's role. 327 From that perspective it does not matter
whether the speech is by an association. And it does not matter
whether we are concerned with the interests of the speaker or the
listener. The problem remains the same. Government decisions
concerning what gets said are not merely economic restrictions,
but censorship, and they fall within the First Amendment's
prohibition because they interfere with the free flow of ideas. Even
those regulations intended to enhance the flow of ideas are
ultimately self-defeating because they entail value judgments
about who can speak and how much they can say.
This was the problem presented by campaign reform
regulations in Citizens United. The Court was unable to reconcile
the individual rights-based marketplace model with government
efforts to modulate the public pre-election debate. Although the
Court recognized that such regulations are censorship, it did not
come to terms with the source of the conflict that brought it to this
conclusion. The conflict posed by objectives protecting the interests
of individuals versus egalitarian goals is an age-old source of
concern for political philosophers contemplating the nature of
justice. Reconciling the conflict with respect to the specific issue of
free speech is, like the conundrum generally, a perennial source of
academic and judicial consternation. 328 The Court simply
324. See supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text (citing to case law and
noting the court composition change, i.e., the switch in time that saved nine).
325. See supra notes 233-46 and accompanying text (noting the end of the
Lochner era).
326. See supra note 278 (citing to POWE).
327. See supra Part IV.B (discussing "the lesser standard of protection
accorded corporate entities.").
328. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedomof Speech,
124 HARv. L. REV. 143 (2010) (arguing that "support for First Amendment
values in fact cuts across conventional political allegiances, and that both
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recognized it was constrained by the limits of its own First
Amendment doctrine-the metaphor of the marketplace of ideasfrom accepting the role of government as an equalizer of citizen
speech. It was compelled by the logic of its own paradigm to
protect the "individual" rights of artificial entities.
Citizens United makes it clear that governmental interference
with speech rights as a means of obtaining some vision of fairness
in pre-election debate will not be tolerated. 329 This Article has
detailed why such devices are theoretically unsupportable and, as
a practical matter, self-defeating. If this Article has made
anything clear, it is that the answer to private brainwashing is not
governmental brainwashing. If the inequities brought upon the
public discourse due to vast differences in wealth in society are to
be tempered, this is not going to come from regulating speech.
Such a regimen would treat the symptom, not the disease. Both
the source of the malady and its cure lie deeper. We need to look at
the nature of the social system that maintains such disparities.
Merely addressing the consequences of that system, as campaign
reform regulations tend to do, is like treating malaria with a bandaid.
The success of modern liberals in obtaining judicial
recognition that private economic interests do not warrant the
same protection afforded interests enshrined in the Bill of Rights
is significant. Nevertheless, this achievement has not been a boon
for legislating adequate remedial social change. In fact, the gap
between powerful and powerless has widened in the decades of
post-Lochner judicial deference to government regulation of
economic interests. Regulation designed to compensate for the
resultant imbalance in the effectiveness of speech that is
symptomatic of such a yawning disparity in resources runs counter
to entrenched First Amendment principles. Nevertheless, the
Court's recognition of governmental ability to regulate private
economic interests still provides the answer. If a more level
playing field in the public discourse pertaining to elections is
desired, the answer lies in achieving a more equitable distribution
of resources in society.

sides in Citizens United are committed to free speech, but to two very different
visions of free speech.").
329. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.

